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How motivated reasoning leads to tolerance of false
claims: Three experimental tests of mechanisms
Many recent electoral events have been characterised by false claims which,
despite abundant fact-checking, were often widely believed. This led to
much talk about a ’post-truth’ politics. Meanwhile, an extensive litera-
ture confirms that false beliefs voters have about political issues are of-
ten highly resistant to correction. The drivers of that resistance are well-
known: people engage in motivated reasoning. They are prone to accept
as fact those claims that confirm their opinions, and dismiss claims that
challenge them.
This dissertation investigates reactions to two types of challenging in-
formation: false information that affirms individuals’ political opinions,
and factual information that challenges them. More specifically, it ex-
plores how the situation individuals are in when exposed to challenging
information affects their susceptibility to engage in motivated reasoning.
In a series of experiments, I explore the effect of three types of situations:
stress, low group status, and exposure to post-truth comments.
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In chapter 1, I explore the effect of stress on tolerance of false claims. I
describe a survey experiment (n=380) fielded shortly after the 2016 Brexit
referendum in which I attempted to induce stress to investigate the effect
of stress on belief in false campaign claims among Leave voters. I found
no effect.
In chapter 2, I explore the effect of low group status on tolerance of false
claims. To test the pure causal mechanism in a non-political environment
I designed a laboratory experiment (n=277). The set-up was a pub quiz
in which one team was disadvantaged, received more difficult questions
and, therefore, a lower payoff than the other team. After the quiz players
were shown two sets of feedback – one person called the quiz ’fair play’;
the other called it ’unfair’ and demanded a top-up for the disadvantaged
team. Crucially, one of the two feedback givers made false claims. As
hypothesized, the disadvantaged team overlooked false claims coming
from the person who sided with their team (but not from the other team).
I discuss implications for 21st century political campaigns in which false
facts about and in which some groups of voters are structually disadvan-
taged.
In chapter 3, I shift to reactions to factually accurate information that chal-
lenges political beliefs. This chapter is joint work with John Bartle and
Rob Johns, Professors of Politics in the Government Department at the
University of Essex. We conducted a nationally representative survey ex-
periment in the UK (n=2936) in which we corrected false beliefs about
immigration. We identified false beliefs on both sides of the immigration
debate (pro and anti-immigration) and showed respondents a fact check
challenging a false claim they had rated as true. We went beyond classic
v
misperception-correction studies in two key ways: First, we used a more
nuanced, seven point true to false scale, which allowed us to trace smaller
changes in the perceived accuracy of false claims. Second, we mimicked
’post-truth’ surroundings in which expert information is rarely the ’fi-
nal’ word: Some of our respondents saw not only the fact check but also
a post-truth comment encouraging them to retain their old beliefs. We
found that fact checks significantly reduced belief in false claims. Expo-
sure to post-truth comments cancelled out some but not all of this effect.
We discuss what these results mean for 21st century election campaigns
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In the aftermath of the Brexit and the Trump election, two long-standing
liberal democracies find themselves deeply divided, with half the elec-
torate puzzled at how the other half voted. As in any election, remain
voters had their reasons to vote remain; leave voters had their reasons to
vote leave; Donald Trump’s voters had their reasons to vote for Donald
Trump and Hillary Clinton’s voters had their reasons to vote for Hillary
Clinton. What made these elections stand apart, however, was the level
of factual inaccuracy in many of the campaign claims. On both sides of
the Atlantic, campaigners on all sides – in particular the Leave and the
Trump campaign – were widely accused of lying.
False information in politics is not new. Even the amount of false infor-
mation in modern campaigns is not unprecedented. What is new is the
way in which many politicians respond when confronted with accusa-
tions that a piece of information they used is false: To many, it does not
seem to matter. That is at the heart of a phenomenon often described
as ’post-truth’. Matthew d’Ancona describes post-truth as a "crash in the
value of truth, comparable to the collapse of a currency or a stock ... Hon-
esty and accuracy are no longer assigned the highest priority in political
exchange" (D’Ancona 2017b, p.8).
The dawn of the post-truth age is difficult to date. Some journalists
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have pointed to Vladimir Putin as a precursor of modern post-truthism
(D’Ancona 2017a). Two years before Britain’s EU referendum and Trump’s
ascent to the United States Presidency, Kremlin-affiliated media outlets
waged what NATO’s top commander General Philip Breedlove called
’the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in
the history of information warfare’ (Pomerantsev 2014). In February and
March of 2014, an army of ’little green men’ – soldiers in military gear
without insignia, carrying Russian weapons – swarmed over the penin-
sula of Crimea, seizing its Supreme Court, its Council of Ministers, and its
parliament building. Putin referred to them as ’local self-defense forces’,
or as ’volunteers’. In a televised question and answer session on 16 April
2014, the Russian President said, "I will say this clearly. There are no Rus-
sian troops in Ukraine" (Oliphant 2015; Engel 2015). A day later, he said,
"Of course our troops stood behind Crimea’s self-defence forces" (Anis-
chchuk 2014). In a documentary aired on state television a year after the
annexation, titled "The Way Home", Putin went a step further, explaining
that specialists were needed to protect Russians in Crimea from violence
and repression by Ukrainian nationalists. "That’s why I gave orders to
the Defense Ministry – why hide it? – to deploy special forces of the
GRU (military intelligence) as well as marines and commandos there ..."
(Schreck 2019). The following year, at a televised press conference in De-
cember 2015, Putin denied again that ’regular forces’ were involved in
the conflict. When a Ukrainian journalist asked about two Russian offi-
cers who had been captured in Crimea and were being held in Ukraine,
Putin replied, "We never said that there weren’t people there dealing with
certain tasks, including in the military sphere. (...) But that doesn’t mean
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there are regular Russian forces there. Feel the difference" (Oliphant
2015). The Soviet-born British journalist Peter Pomerantsev pointed out
how Putin’s propaganda is different from Soviet propaganda: "For the
Soviets, the idea of truth was important– even when they were lying. So-
viet propaganda went to great lengths to ’prove’ that the Kremlin’s theo-
ries or bits of disinformation were fact." Putin barely tried to cover up his
own lies.
Comparing campaigns in liberal democracies like the United Kingdom
and in the United States to campaigns in autocratic regimes like Russia
is, in many ways, comparing apples to oranges. But the importance that
top government officials in all three countries attach to the factual accu-
racy of their own statements bears resemblance. The way the Leave cam-
paign dealt with the revelation that one of their key campaign promises
was based on a false number is a case in point. On his blog, Dominik
Cummings, campaign director of Vote Leave in 2015-16 laid out the five
foundations of his campaign. First, "’Let’s take back control’. The overall
theme." Second, "The official bill of EU membership is £350 million per
week – let’s spend our money on our priorities like the NHS instead.’"
The £350 million claim was debunked on numerous occasions. Even the
UK Statistics Authority wrote to Vote Leave during the referendum cam-
paign, saying the claim was misleading and undermined trust in official
statistics. It excluded the UK’s rebate negotiated by Margaret Thatcher in
1984 (the UK pays significantly less than the 1 per cent of national GDP
that member states are normally expected to pay), and it failed to account
for payments received by the UK from the EU. The figure also failed to
take into account the contribution to the treasury of trade and business
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that would not have happened without the EU single market (Henley
2016). And yet, many Leave campaigner continued to repeat this false
claim. The statement ’We send the EU £350 million a week. Let’s fund
the NHS instead’ adorned the Leave campaign bus until the day of the
referendum.
Why would campaigners keep repeating a number that is known to be
false? According to Cummings’ own account, the Leave campaign used
the false number because ’it worked’. He wrote, "The Treasury gross fig-
ure is slightly more than £350m of which we get back roughly half. (...)
Sometimes we said ‘we send the EU £350m’ to provoke people into argu-
ment. This worked much better than I thought it would." On 23 June 2016
51.9 per cent of UK voters voted to leave the European Union. Cummings
commented, "Would we have won without immigration? No. Would
we have won without £350m/NHS? All our research and the close result
strongly suggests No." In January 2018 – a year and a half after the EU ref-
erendum – Boris Johnson, then Foreign Secretary, reopened the row about
the £350m/NHS claim. In an interview with the Guardian he claimed the
figure was an underestimation: "There was an error on the side of the bus.
We grossly underestimated the sum over which we would be able to take
back control" (Stewart and Asthana 2018).
Five months after the UK’s EU referendum, Donald Trump was voted
into office. If his take on the relevance of factual accuracy was not clear
by then it became clear on day one of his presidency. Trump’s presidency
began with a fight over whose inauguration crowd was bigger: His or
that of former U.S. President Barack Obama. Photographic evidence sug-
gested the latter. When photos of the two crowds were published side
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by side (showing without any doubt that Obama had drawn the larger
crowd) the newly inaugurated President resorted to creative evidence-
making: He asked a government photographer to edit the official pictures
of the inauguration (Swaine 2018).
White House Secretary Sean Spicer called a special press conference on
the matter. He insisted that Trump’s inauguration had drawn "the largest
audience to ever witness an inauguration, period, both in person and
around the globe". The ungrateful task of explaining why Sean Spicer
had lied at his very first press conference fell to Kellyanne Conway, se-
nior aid to the president. The following day, on NBC’s Meet the Press,
Conway coined what would become the catchphrase of the year: "Don’t
be so overly dramatic about it, Chuck. You’re saying it’s a falsehood.
(...) Sean Spicer, our press secretary, gave alternative facts to that" (NBC
News 2017a). Just like Putin, Conway suggested that the number – the
facts – did not matter. Her point was clear: You have your version of
what happened, I have mine, and that is fine.
Trump’s own interactions with journalists paint a similar picture. One
of the earlier cases in which the United States President had to explain
one of his false statements occurred at a White House news conference in
February 2017. NBC’s Peter Alexander enquired after Trump’s statement
that he had achieved the biggest electoral college win since Ronald Rea-
gan. Alexander began to quote the number of votes Obama had received
in 2008 when Trump interrupted him, saying he had been talking about
Republicans. In reply, Alexander started reading out statistics about the
number of votes George H.W. Bush had won in 1988. The President inter-
rupted him again, saying: "I was given that information. I was just given
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it. We had a very, very big margin." Alexander proceeded to ask: "... why
should the American people trust you when you accuse the information
they receive as being fake when you’re providing information that’s not
accurate?" Trump repeated: "I was given that information. I actually, I’ve
seen that information around. But it was a very substantial victory, do
you agree with that?" (NBC News 2017b). This widely cited interaction
reveals two things: First, the United States President used false numbers
to exaggerate his victory. (More harshly, one might say he lied.) Second,
and more importantly, the United States President did not seem to care
whether his claim was correct. He had compared the two crowds to make
a point. What mattered was the point, not the facts.
In these three cases the politicians’ false claims were widely corrected.
The identity of the ’little green men’ who annexed Crimea has been an
open secret from the day (or night) they appeared. The £350 million a
week claim was the most fiercely debunked claim of the Brexit referen-
dum. Countless broadcasters and newspapers reported that the United
Kingdom’s cheque to Brussels was far lower than £350 million a week.
And the side-by-side photos of Trump’s and Obama’s inauguration crowds
that went viral on social media left no doubt as to whose crowd was big-
ger. In all three cases, journalists and fact-checking charities went to great
lengths to verify information. Fact checking became a profession. Fact
checkers checked politicians’ statements on a daily basis; major debates
were sometimes even fact checked in real time. In all three countries,
the majority of voters have access to the internet. The facts were only
just a google search away. And yet, election results in all three countries
seemed to suggest that voters did not punish politicians for lying.
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In his book, ’Post-Truth’ Matthew d’Ancona quotes the Serbian-American
writer Steve Tesich who coined the word ’post-truth’ in a 1992 article.
Tesich wrote that Watergate and the Iran-Contra scandal had trauma-
tized the American public to the extent that they had started to discredit
the value of truth. He wrote: "We are rapidly becoming prototypes of a
people that totalitarian monsters could only drool about in their dreams.
All the dictators up to now have had to work hard at suppressing the
truth. We, by our actions, are saying that this is no longer necessary, that
we have acquired a spiritual mechanism that can denude truth of any
significance. In a very fundamental way we, as a free people, have freely
decided that we want to live in some post-truth world."
This dissertation is about the citizen consumers of false facts. I ask: When
do voters tolerate false information and when do notice, or punish it?
How does the situation they are in when they are confronted with chal-
lenging information affect the way in which they process false informa-
tion? What makes voters overlook false claims? And how do voters react
to information that is challenging in a different way: not because it is
false but because it challenges what they thought was true? What do
voters make of statistics that challenge information they were convinced
was true? What if their political opinions are built on that information,
which, as they now find out, the experts say is false? How much trust to
modern voters place in experts, anyway? And what if the experts do not
have the ’final word’? What if people around them doubt the experts?
Do post-truth surroundings undermine whatever credibility is left in a
post-truth age?
This work builds on a large body of research on motivated reasoning
8 Contents
(Kunda 1990; Kraft, Lodge, and Taber 2015; Lodge and Taber 2007; Lodge
and Taber 2013). As its name suggests, the theory holds that "all reason-
ing is motivated". We pursue not only accuracy goals but also directional
goals: "people are more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to
arrive at" (Kunda 1987; Kunda 1990). Kahan (2016b) defines motivated
reasoning as "the tendency of individuals to unconsciously conform their
assessment of information to some goal collateral to determining its truth."
The goal, he notes, "can be myriad": individuals may wish to maintain a
positive self-conception, to rationalize self-serving behaviour, to avoid
anticipated stress or anxiety of unwelcome news, or to perceive coher-
ence rather than complexity in information that is relevant to important
decisions (see Kahan 2016b, p.2). In ’politically motivated reasoning’ the
goal is ’the formation of beliefs that maintain a person’s connection to
and status within an identity-defining affinity group whose members are
united by shared values’ [ibid]. In other words, the decision whether to
credit or to discredit a new piece of information does not only depend
on my perception of how true or false it is. It also depends on how I
believe that crediting or discrediting that piece of information will affect
my standing in a group of people who share my values, for instance, the
political party I support (see also Klein 2015; Harari 2018). Naturally,
this affects the way I process new information: A long tradition of re-
search has found evidence of ’confirmation bias’ – selectively crediting
information that confirms prior beliefs and discrediting information that
disconfirms it (Nickerson 1998).
The classic demonstration of motivated reasoning and one of the first
studies in the field is Ross, Lepper and Hubbard’s dealth penalty study
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(Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard 1975). The authors sought out individu-
als with strong views in favour or against capital punishment and asked
them to read two reports about the effectiveness of death penalty as a de-
terrent against crime. One report found it was effective; the other found
it was ineffective. Both opponents and proponents of death penalty ar-
gued that the study that was consistent with their own opinion was most
persuasive, and found fault with the respective other study. Since then, a
large number of other studies have consistently shown that voters tend to
see information through a partisan lens (Wlezien, Franklin, and Twiggs
1997; Bartels 2002; G. Evans and Andersen 2006; G. Evans and Pickup
2010; Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2013; De Vries, Hobolt, and
Tilley 2015) and that false beliefs, once established, tend to resist correc-
tion (Lewandowsky, Stritzke, et al. 2005; Gaines et al. 2007; Sides and Cit-
rin 2007; Jacobson 2010; Nyhan 2010; Thorson 2015; Schaffner and Roche
2017; Jerit and Barabas 2012; Nyhan, Reifler, and Ubel 2013; Lodge and
Taber 2013; Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Eric C. Nisbet, Cooper, and Garrett
2015; Nyhan and Reifler 2015a; De Vries, Hobolt, and Tilley 2015; Nyhan
and Reifler 2017; Barrera et al. 2018; Flynn and Krupnikov 2019).
Westen et al. (2006) provided the first neuroimaging evidence for moti-
vated reasoning. During the 2004 U.S. presidential elections, the authors
conducted experiments, in which they asked supporters of U.S. Presi-
dential Candidates George Bush and John Kerry to consider consonant
and dissonant information about both candidates. Magnetic resonance
imaging showed that the reasoning areas of partisans’ brains shut down
when they were considering information that was threatening to their
own candidate. In contrast, when they saw positive information about
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their preferred candidate, the emotional areas of the brain lit up. Hence,
it seems that a certain proclivity to motivated reasoning is hard-wired in
our DNA (see also Van Veen et al. 2009).
This dissertation contributes to a nascent body of literature investigating
factors that mitigate (or worsen) motivated reasoning biases. To date,
most of this research evolves around the question of how to present writ-
ten information in a non- (or less) threatening way. A number of guide-
lines for journalists and public broadcasters have been established: If
possible, corrective information ought to include graphs, come from a
credible source, and close causal gaps left by retracted information. False
information ought not to be repeated; instead, correct information ought
to be confirmed (see Nyhan and Reifler (2013) for a summary of research
findings).
Another strand of research investigates the effect of accuracy incentives
on accurate answers. Scholars in this field have questioned an underlying
assumption of much of the motivated reasoning literature: that respon-
dents who give wrong, partisan answers actually believe what they say.
Bolsen, Druckman, and F. L. Cook (2014) found that a written accuracy
incentive (’Please try to view the policy in an evenhanded way and from
various perspectives’) reduced partisan motivated reasoning. Similarly,
Prior, Sood, and Khanna (2015) and Bullock et al. (2015) found that mon-
etary accuracy incentives can reduce the gap between Democrats and Re-
publicans in responses to ’partisan’ factual questions. Schaffner and Luks
argue that at least some of the false beliefs partisans report in survey
result not from genuinely held misperceptions but from partisan cheer-
leading (Schaffner and Luks 2018). In contrast, in a series of experiments
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using a slightly different design Berinsky (2018) found little evidence of
expressive responding.
A smaller strand of research has explored the effect of personality differ-
ences and, in particular ideology on motivated reasoning biases – here,
some early studies have found that conservative respondents were more
likely to engage in motivated reasonings (McCright and Dunlap 2011).
More recent studies found no effect of partisanship (Berinsky 2018; Ka-
han 2013). (Berinsky 2018) found that liberals were slightly more likely to
engage in motivated reasoning (Berinsky 2018).
This dissertation seeks to contribute to a a nascent strand of research in-
vestigating how situational factors affect motivated reasoning biases. A
few factors have been tested already. Nyhan and Zeitzoff (2017) tested if
feelings of control affected individuals’ susceptibility to denying wrong-
doing that their group has inflicted on others. They found no effect. Lee,
Kim, and Schwarz (2015a) explored the effect of a ’fishy’ smell on moti-
vated reasoning biases. They found that it increased the likelihood that
respondents detected a semantic distortion (the ’Moses illusion’) and the
likelihood that they engaged in negative hypothesis testing (falsifying
their first hunch). Others investigated the effect of self-affirmation exer-
cises: G. L. Cohen et al. (2007) and Koningsbruggen, Das, and Roskos-
Ewoldsen (2009) found a a positive effect on accepting counterattitudinal
messages.
I explore the effect of three situational factors on motivated reasoning
biases: stress, low status, and post-truth surroundings. All three have
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received little attention as potential predictors of motivated reasoning bi-
ases. To date, there is one study on the effect of stress (or time pressure)
on the likelihood of detecting false facts (Bago, Rand, and Pennycook
(2020), in press at the Journal of experimental psychology). A few stud-
ies, in particular Mutz (2018) and Major, Blodorn, and Major Blascovich
(2016) have investigated the effect of status threat on voting behaviour in
election campaigns with abundant false information. I am not aware of
any studies testing the effect of post-truth messages on tolerance of false
claims or on reactions to expert advice.
Examining external factors that might affect voters’ confirmation bias or
the likelihood of detecting dodgy information in political campaigns I
make no assumptions as to who is more or less susceptible to these bi-
ases. I do not assume that voters on either one side of the Brexit or Trump
electorate were any more gullible than voters on the other side. Hence, I
challenge an implicit assumption of much of the ensuing post-truth talk:
that Brexit voters believed in the false claims spread by the Leave cam-
paign’s lies and that Trump voters believed in his false claims. Instead, I
seek to investigate mechanisms that lead any individual, or any group of
individuals to overlook false claims in political campaigns.
Because I test causal mechanisms I rely on randomized experiments. Ran-
domly assigning respondents to a treatment or a control groups allows
researchers to control for bias from unknown confounders. Therefore,
randomized controlled experiments are often seen as the ’gold standard’
of causal inference (Brass, Nunez-Neto, and Williams 2006; Bickman and
Reich 2009). Two of the three studies described in this dissertation are
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survey experiments (chapter 1 and chapter 3); one is a laboratory experi-
ment (chapter 2).
Chapter 1 is about the effect of stress on motivated reasoning biases.
Building on dual-process models of information processing I argue that
stress, or time pressure might shift respondents to an intuitive (system
1) rather than analytical (system 2) thinking style and, thereby, increase
confirmation bias. To test this hypothesis I needed a population of voters
with strong political views and objectively false information that chal-
lenged their political views. I found both in the Brexit referendum. I
hypothesized that stress caused Leave voters to overlook factual inaccu-
racies in Leave campaign claims. I used a popular platform for polit-
ical discussions to recruit participants: Twitter. Recruiting participants
through twitter is a low (or, in this case no)-cost way to obtain a conve-
nience sample (see Mullinix et al. (2015) on the generalizability of survey
experiments using convenience samples). What is more, using twitter
allowed me to selectively contact voters who held strong views in the
Brexit debate: I tweeted at twitter users who had previously used an EU
referendum-related hashtag. The survey experiment I report on in this
chapter was embedded in a larger survey by Rob Johns, Professor of Pol-
itics at the University of Essex, Marcel van Egmond, Senior Lecturer at
the University of Amsterdam, and Heinz Brandenburg, Senior Lecturer
in Politics at the University of Strathclyde. About a third of the twitter
users who clicked on the link we sent them were directed to my short
survey experiment; the rest participated in Johns, van Egmond’s, and
Brandenburg’s survey. We fielded the survey in June 2016, shortly after
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the Brexit referendum (n=277 including 99 Leave voters). My study fo-
cused on respondents who had just voted to leave the European Union.
I hypothesized that exposure to a subliminal stressor would increase a
gut feeling they had just expressed at the polls: that the Leave cam-
paign claims were true. Creating a subliminal stressor in a survey ex-
periment proved difficult. I relied on time pressure, a common stress ma-
nipulation: Respondents in the stress treatment group were given 35 sec-
onds to answer a few questions about the European Union. (I chose EU-
related questions to remain in line with the announced topic of the sur-
vey). While they were answering those questions a timer counted down
to 0; if they reached 0 without answering a question they were automat-
ically forwarded to the next page. Control group respondents answered
the same three questions, but without the timer. Next, respondents were
shown a list of statements including a few false claims. Results showed
no effect of the stress treatment on belief in these false claims. I argue that
these null findings are not conclusive evidence: the time respondents in
both groups spent answering the quiz indicates that the 35 second time
limit was too long. I conclude that the time pressure probably failed to
induce stress and that more research is needed to clarify the role of stress
in motivated reasoning biases.
Chapter 2 is about the effect of status differences on motivated reasoning
biases. The theoretical starting point is social identity theory. A number
of studies in the social identity theory tradition have found that individ-
uals are willing to make sacrifices for in-groups, even in minimal group
settings (such as groups that are assigned based on over or undestimat-
ing the number of dots in a frame, or preference for an abstract painting),
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and even at their own expense (that is, if out-group punishment entails
a cost, see Tajfel and Turner (1986) for a summary of social identity the-
ory and early findings). My broader, general hypothesis is that the sacri-
fices individuals are willing to take to express in-group preference extend
to overlooking false information coming from in-group members or any
favourable individual. In the experiment I report on I do not test this
general hypothesis but a more specific version, adding status differences
to the equation.
According to social identity theory, groups are particularly likely to rise
up if they perceive status differences to be unstable and illegitimate. I
speculate that this higher willingness to engage in conflict goes hand
in hand with cognitive biases in information processing. If a group is
low in status, if they perceive status differences to be illegitimate, if they
have reason to believe that those status differences can be overturned,
and if they are then confronted with an individual who acknowledges
their hardship and calls for justice then group members will overlook
things that might otherwise set off alarm bells – such as, for instance,
false claims. The same ought to apply to groups who see themselves not
at the bottom of the social ladder, but toward the middle, or even the
higher ranks and who fear for their status. A few studies have found
support for the hypothesis that status loss (e.g. a declining financial po-
sition, or the perception that one’s country was loosing status) was asso-
ciated with voting for Trump (Mutz 2018), or for Brexit (Antonucci, Hor-
vath, and Krouwel 2017). I speculate that the missing link is overlooking
’fishy’ information: Status threat may have been one of the factors that
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led Brexit and Trump voters to overlook, ignore, or pardon factual inac-
curacies in these campaigns – and, consequently, to vote for them despite
those factual inaccuracies.
The hypothesis I seek to test in this study is simple: Low status or status
threat causes group members to overlook factual inaccuracies in political
campaigns that promise to raise their group’s status. It is generally ac-
knowledged that the best way to test causal claims in an observational
setting is using panel data. In this case, one would need to set up a
multi-year panel study, in which some groups experience a decline in
group status, and track reactions to false claims in political campaigns.
(I would expect threatened groups to become more willing to overlook
false claims, and I would not expect to see any difference among groups
whose status is not under threat).
Post hoc it is obviously impossible to set up a panel study to explore re-
actions to false claims in the Brexit or Trump campaing. Diana Mutz,
however, came close to the ideal research design: In her groundbreaking
study on the effect of status loss she used a panel of U.S. respondents who
were interviewed in Oct 2012 and again in Oct 2016, just before Donald
Trump was elected President. The interviews included questions that al-
lowed her to estimate perceived status threat. (Her outcome variable was
not tolerance of false facts but support for Trump. Mutz found that those
who lost jobs or experienced stagnant wages due to the loss of manufac-
turing jobs punished the incumbent (Democratic) party.)
Because a panel study was not feasible I opted for an experiment, manip-
ulating status and observing reactions to false information rather than
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waiting for group status to change and observe reactions to false infor-
mation. There are two approaches to manipulate status in a lab: Working
with real group identities or creating group identities. The first approach
relies on existing group identities, such as a person’s partisan identity,
their religious, ethnic, or cultural identity, their family, gender, profes-
sion, sports team, club, or any other group of people they identify with.
The researcher would recruit a sample of individuals belonging to the
same group and randomly assign some of them to a treatment group
and others to a control. The difficulty is in designing a treatment that
effectively threatens group members perception of their status. For in-
stance, to threaten the status of natives scholars have often resorted to
statistics about rising numbers of immigrants. This is the approach Ma-
jor, Blodorn, and Major Blascovich (2016) took. The authors reminded
their sample of white Americans that whites in the United States would
soon be outnumbered by non-whites. (Their results showed that among
Americans high in ethnic identification this racial status threat increased
support for Donald Trump.)
The second approach, creating group identities, has a long tradition in
social psychology and behavioral economics. Scholars have found that
behaviour in minimal groups closely resembles behaviour in real social
groups. Even if group assignment is arbitrary (e.g. based on preference
for a painting) group members show in-group favoritism, inter-group
competition, and out-group hostility (Tajfel 1970; Tajfel and Turner 1986;
Eckel and Grossman 2005). Creating identities in a laboratory setting
rather than working with real identities has several advantages: On a
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practical side, it does not require finding a large-enough sample of re-
spondents who share a common group identity. Given the ease with
which group identity is created in a lab any individual, including un-
dergraduate students from across the world, can participate in the study
(Tajfel 1970; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Eckel and Grossman 2005; Chen and
Li 2009).
What is more, a laboratory study allows the researcher a degree of con-
trol that minimizes noise (or the share of subjects who respond to the
treatment) Experiments that manipulate real group status typically suf-
fer from a fairly high level of noise. For instance, in the study mentioned
above, (Major, Blodorn, and Major Blascovich 2016) not every white reader
will have felt threatened after reading that whites will soon be outnum-
bered. The fewer respondents are expected to respond to a treatment the
higher the required sample size. In contrast, a laboratory setting allows
the reseracher to manipulate status for all group members and to con-
trol to what extent status is manipulated. Finally, testing a causal mech-
anism in laboratory experiment allows the researcher to test the bare-
bones version of the mechanism, disregarding any known or unknown
group-specific peculiarities that might affect the outcome variables.
For the purposes of the study I report on in this dissertation I took the
second approach, testing the mechanism in a controlled laboratory ex-
periment fielded in Colchester in the summer of 2018 (n=277). Respon-
dents were randomly assigned to one of two groups: Team A and Team
B. I used a pub quiz-style geography quiz to induce status differences.
The set-up was simple: Respondents were randomly assigned to Team A
or Team B. What they did not know was that the questions were drawn
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from two different sets, one easy and one difficult. For team A, the odds
of drawing a difficult question were 1:4 for Team B, they were 4:1. Be-
cause pay-off hinged on individual and group performance Team B had
a much lower average payoff.
To mimic a politician who would promise to raise a group’s status (but
also lie) I exposed respondents to two types of feedback, allegedly com-
ing from fellow players. One feedback giver sided with the advantaged
team, calling the game ’fair play’ and congratulating the winning team.
The other feedback giver sided with the disadvantaged team, calling the
quiz ’unfair’ and demanding Team B be paid more to offset the disad-
vantage. Crucially, one of the two lied: I randomly assigned a false claim
and a grossly exaggerated claim to one of the two opinions. As expected,
results showed that low status affected tolerance of false facts: Members
of the disadvantaged team overlooked false claims if those false claims
came from the person who had sided with their team and demanded
they be paid more. If, however, they came from the person who had
sided with the other team they were more likely to be noticed.
Chapter 3, the final chapter is about the effect of post-truth surroundings
on motivated reasoning biases. I report results from a study exploring
the effect of post-truth surroundings on reactions to unsolicited, counter-
attitudinal expert advice. Here, my interest was not a subset of a pop-
ulation, but the entire population of voters in England, Scotland, and
Wales. This is a co-authored project with Rob Johns and John Bartle, Pro-
fessors of Politics in the Government Department at the University of
Essex. To combine the causal power of experiments the generalizabil-
ity of population-based samples we used a population-based experiment
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(Mutz 2011).
We operated on the assumption that fact checks are useful but rarely have
the last word: In a post-truth world, news are heavily commented, and
not all comments acknowledge the authority of expert opinion. Hence,
we ask: Does exposure to comments telling you not to take an expert too
seriously make you more likely to reject unwanted statistics? To find out,
we ran a large-n study (n=2936), fielded by Deltapoll to a representative
sample of residents in England, Scotland, and Wales in June 2018. We
used a topic on which misperceptions abound among liberals and con-
servatives: immigration.
At the beginning of the survey, we identified false beliefs and showed
participants a fact-check correcting one of their false beliefs. Next, we
showed some (but not all) a post-truth comment, saying that ’I would
take these statistics with a pinch of salt’. In a 2*3 design we varied the
authoritativeness of the post-truth commenter (LSE Professor / Blogger)
and the reason why they said they would take the statistics with a grain
of salt. We found that fact-checks worked: All four expert statements
significantly reduced belief in the corrected false claims. However, post-
truth comments worked, too: They eliminated some (but not all) of the
effect of the fact check. Whether the post-truth commenter was an LSE
professor or a a blogger had no effect. The reason they gave to ignore the
expert did not matter either: Saying the fact checker was probably biased
was just as effective as saying their information did not match people’s
everyday experience or saying that ’when in doubt, it’s best to trust your
instinct.’
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An electronic version of this dissertation, as well as supporting docu-





The Effect of Stress on Belief in
False Facts in the Brexit Debate
1.1 Abstract
This study investigated the effect of stress on belief in false facts in the
leadup to Britain’s EU referendum. An online survey was distributed
via twitter to United Kingdom residents in the immediate aftermath of
the EU referendum. Participants (n=380, including 99 leave voters) were
randomly assigned to a stress treatment (a timed quiz about the EU) or
a control condition (the same quiz, not timed). Contrary to expectations,
this study did not find any evidence that stress increased belief in false
campaign claims. The null results may be due to an ill-designed stress
treatment: The 35 second timer proved too long to induce stress. Hence,




The United Kingdom’s EU referendum was characterized by a high level
of uncertainty, and high stakes. Leave campaigners portrayed a ’remain’
vote as surrendering to Brussels, and as sending the nation’s wealth to
Brussels at the expense of the national health system The Sun (2016).
Leaving the EU, they said, would free up £350 million a year for the
country’s cash-strapped National Health Service (Reuben 2016). Remain
campaigners warned of an unprecedented economic downturn. Leaving
the EU, they said, could cost families £4,300 a year. Leave campaigners,
in turn, called those predictions ’fearmongering’ (Reuben 2016). Voters
were in unchartered territory. Many felt uninformed, and overwhelmed.
In early June, an LSE survey found that up to 30 per cent of voters would
wait for the last week to decide how to vote, with half of those only de-
ciding finally on the day of the referendum (Helm 2016). The referendum
was also characterized by false information. The two sides accused each
other of lying (Giles 2016). Independent fact-checking charities and pub-
lic broadcasters debunked some of the key promises of the Leave cam-
paign as factually inaccurate. In particular, the claim that the UK sent the
EU GBP 350 a week was, simply, false. And yet, Leave campaign contin-
ued to repeat the false number; and even kept it on their campaign bus.
Leave won.
This study explores a causal link between the type of stress or mental
fatigue voters experience as a result of being overwhelmed by difficult-
to-digest information and their susceptibility to overlooking factual in-
accuracies in campaign claims. It builds on a large body of literature
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suggesting that individuals use one of two routes to process information:
thinking ’fast’ or ’slow’ (Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman 2002; Kahne-
man 2011; J. S. B. T. Evans 2008; Petty 1994). The slow route (’system
2’, ’peripheral route’, or ’heuristic processing’) is quick and dirty: Indi-
viduals rely on heuristics, or mental shortcuts to evaluate information.
Decisions are taken instinctively. The slow route (’System 2’ (Kahneman
2011), ’central route’ (Petty 1994), or ’systematic processing’ (Chaiken
1980) entails careful, effortful, and logical deliberation. In an ideal world,
voters would use the slow route to process campaign claims. They would
seek out information about the arguments on both sides of a debate, they
would think about it, fact check information as needed, accept what is
true, reject (and forget) what is false and come to a well-informed conclu-
sion as to which argument is most convincing. Then, they would vote.
In the real world, voters rarely have the time, energy, or motivation to
think carefully about every snippet of political information they are con-
sciously or subconsciously exposed to.
A large body of political science literature testifies to the fact that vot-
ers use heuristics to take decisions, effectively outsourcing the cognitive
work of seeking out and evaluating information to sources they trust, be
it political parties, television channels, newspapers, blogs, or other in-
dividuals or groups of individuals (Robert Johns 2009). Generally, this
works surprisingly well: "People can be knowledgeable in their reason-
ing about political choices without necessarily possessing a large body
of knowledge about politics" (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991, p.19,
see also Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009). However, the quality of a system
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1 voting decision depends on the person or the institution whose judg-
ment a voter trusts. If a voter trusts a particular party to pursue policies
that are in their best interest and if that party actually does pursue these
policies then the voter can save themselves the time and effort it takes to
evaluate the policy proposals. The problem is that this is not always the
case.
If British voters who put their trust in tabloids such as The Sun or The
Daily Mail or in populist politicians such as Nigel Farage, or Boris John-
son took a quick system 1 route when faced with the decision how to vote
they may have overlooked a crucial detail: that many of their promises
were based on false figures. For instance, if a voter saw the £350m claim
and took the fast route to process it they may have thought that this was
an excellent reason to leave, because that is a lot of money and the NHS
needs it. (This gut reaction is especially likely to be true for the many
British citizens waitlisted to see a specialist or have an operation.) It takes
a system 2 route to see potential problems. In this case, thinking slowly
would not help detect the wrong figure. (Research on innumeracy has
found that the human brain is unable to imagine large numbers (Paulos
2001).) However, it might lead voters to entertain the idea that Britain
would not be able to divert the entire budget that is now transferred to
the EU over to the NHS. For instance, thinking slowly might have led
them to consider that there is a ’divorce bill’ which makes large payments
to the NHS unlikely in the short term. Thinking slowly about the long-
term consequences might have helped voters see that at least some funds
would be needed to offset other payments from the EU, or that, or that
leaving might have a negative effect on trade, which would reduce the
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per-capita income, and, thereby, tax revenues. Thinking slowly does (and
should) not lead everybody to the same conclusion. In this case, Thinking
slowly about this argument and the many other arguments by forward by
the two campaigns will have led some to vote leave and others to vote re-
main. In both cases, it would have been a well-informed decision. Many
voters took a well-informed decision – but not all. Hence, I hypothesize
that feeling stressed, or rushed, nudges voters to use the fast route and
overlook factual inaccuracies.
A growing body of scholars in psychology and behavioural economics
study the effect of stress on decision-making. Experimental treatments
vary considerably, as do scholars’ definitions of stress. Seymour Levine
noted that "Attempts at definitions of stress have bewildered many an
illustrious scholar" (Levine 1985). Some scholars define (and measure)
stress as an increase in cortisol or other physiological measures, others
point to behavioral features (see Buckert, Oechsler, and Schwieren 2014),
still others do not define it at all. In particular, the difference between
’stress’, ’cognitive load’ and ’mental fatigue’ are unclear; the terms are
often used interchangeably, experimenal treatments of ’mental fatigue’
closely resemble those others use to manipulate ’stress’. For the pur-
poses of this study I follow Marcora, Staiano, and Manning’s definition
of mental fatigue: ’a psychobiological state caused by prolonged periods
of demanding cognitive activity’ (Marcora, Staiano, and Manning 2009).
The overall finding is that stress impairs deliberate reasoning. Instead,
28 Chapter 1.
decisions are taken instinctively. Individuals under stress scan fewer al-
ternatives (rather than considering all options), show an impaired mem-
ory performance, think less strategically and often take suboptimal de-
cisions (Janis 1982; Keinan, Friedland, and Ben-Porath 1987; Dougherty
and Hunter 2003; Galván and Rahdar 2013; Staal 2004; Starcke and Brand
2012; Leder, Häusser, and Mojzisch 2013; Gok and Atsan 2016). Yu (2016)
proposed that stress elicits a switch from analytic system 2 thinking to
intuitive system 1 thinking. (He predicted that this switch led to less
activity in the prefrontal executive control regions and more activity in
subcortical reactive emotion brain areas and called for research exam-
ining the underlying neural mechanism proposed.) The effect of stress
on political behaviour is less studied. In particular, we know very lit-
tle about how stress affects political information processing. To date, I
am only aware of one study that explored the effect of stress on detect-
ing false information in political statements: In a 2019 study in the U.S.
Bago, Rand, and Pennycook (2020) tested the effect of giving respondents
more thinking time. The authors presented respondents with a series of
headlines and asked them to give an initial, intuitive response under time
pressure and concurrent working memory load. Later on, they allowed
respondents to re-think their answers. As hypothesized, rethinking cor-
rected intuitive mistakes: Respondents believed false headlines (but not
true headlines) more when they had to give a quick answer than when
they were allowed to take time to think about them.
I tested the effect of stress on tolerance of false claims in the United King-
dom during the Brexit debate. The Brexit referendum lent itself to an
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analysis as a number of false claims had been spread and had been cor-
rected. I focused on false facts spread by the leave side – not because
all Remain claims were factually accurate but because the controversial
claims concerned predictions about the economic impact of Brexit (which
were, obviously, not falsifiable). I used an online survey experiment to
test to what extent a subliminal stressor made twitter-recruited Leave
voters believe in the false facts of the Leave campaign. Results showed
that among the whole sample the stressor – a short timed quiz about the
EU – had no affect on belief in false facts. However, it found heteroge-
neous treatment effects: subjective social status moderated the effect of
the stress treatment on belief in false facts. Subjects who saw themselves
at the bottom of British society performed worse under stress. This was
true for leave voters; and, surprisingly, also for remain voters. Similarly,
citizens who expected their personal finances to get worse as a result
of Brexit and citizens who were low in self-esteem showed significantly
higher levels of belief in false facts than their peers in the control group.
Implications of the difficulty of these subgroups (or of the left behind) to
evaluate facts under stress are discussed.
1.3 Method
Twitter was used to recruit an opinionated sample of leave voters. To in-
duce a stress, I used time pressure. Experimental researchers have used
a number of manipulations to induce stress; most were lab-based and,
therefore, not applicable for this study. 1 To date there is no standard
1 Researchers in psychology often use a combination of public speaking and/or
arithmetic tasks in front of a panel to induce psychosocial stress (for instance, the Trier
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approach for survey experiments. A common denominator in many of
these manipulations is a cognitive task and time pressure. For the pur-
poses of this online study I therefore designed a cognitively demanding
taks to be completed under time pressures. For a cognitively challeng-
ing task that would not deviate from the announced topic of the survey
I chose the three standard questions the Eurobarometer uses to measure
knowledge of the EU. In 2015, only 27 per cent of British respondents
answered all three questions correctly (Hix 2015).
Data were collected through a qualtrics survey fielded to twitter users
shortly after the 23 June 2016 EU referendum. Twitter was chosen as
a recruitment tool in order to obtain a sample of British residents who
held strong opinions about Brexit. This project was embedded in a larger
project about public opinion dynamics during the EU referendum cam-
paign by Rob Johns, Professors of Politics in the Government Department
at the University of Essex, Heinz Brandenburg, Senior Lecturer in Politics
at the University of Strathclyde, and Marcel van Egmond, Senior Lecturer
in Research Methods, Department of Communication Science, University
of Amsterdam (Brandenburg, Egmond, and Rob Johns 2017).
We created five matching twitter accounts with handles that reflected
Social Stress requires participants to make an interview-style presentation, followed by
a surprise mental arithmetic test, in front of an interview panel who do not provide feed-
back or encouragement, see Cingl 2018; Leder, Häusser, and Mojzisch 2013). Physical
treatments are also common; one method is to induce active stress is the Cold Pressor
Test (CPT), in which respondents are asked to submerge their forearm in ice water for 3
minutes (room-temperature water for the control group) (FeldmanHall et al. 2015, e.g.),
others involve running on a treadmill. (Hepler and Kovacs 2017, e.g.). Cognitive stress
manipulations are also common, for instance, studies have used arithmetic tasks (Hep-
ler and Kovacs 2017, e.g.), such as repeating numbers (S. Duffy and J. Smith 2014), serial
substraction tasks (Hepler and Kovacs 2017, e.g.); or colour-naming Stroop (CNS) tasks
(M. R. Smith et al. 2016; Buckert, Oechsler, and Schwieren 2014).
1.3. Method 31
the intent of the survey (BrexitStudy, BrexitSurvey, eurefstudy, EURef-
Surv2016, and brexit_survey). In lieu of a bio we wrote a short descrip-
tion, ’A research project from the Universities of Essex, Strathclyde &
Amsterdam. We don’t take sides, but we’re keen to hear which side
you’re on.’ A link to the Government Department at the University of
Essex was provided underneath this description. A picture of an EU and
a British flag was used as a profile picture, 10 Downing Street was used
as a background picture to capture the attention of subjects interested in
politics (see A.1a). Potential respondents were identified based on their
tweeting behaviour: We sent out direct messages to 6651 individuals who
had used Brexit-related hashtags in the weeks before the referendum.
Our messages included a short invitation text 2. and an individualized
link (so that it could only be taken once). About two third of respondents
(n=652) were directed to Brandenburg, Egmond, and John’s study, the
remaining third was directed to this study.
Data collection started on 25 June and ended on 2 August 2016; most sub-
jects participated in the first two weeks after the referendum (see figure
fig:timing). Participants were not paid. Most respondents used the indi-
vidualized link, some used an open link which we sent to respondents
who were unable to open the individualized link in their browser. Data
were pre-screened for completeness and residence in the United King-
dom. The final sample consisted of 357 subjects, aged 16 to 75, 63 per
cent male. 319 lived in England, 26 in Scotland, nine in Wales, and three
2The wording of the invitations sent to our subjects varied slightly; one of five ver-
sions read “@TwitterName: Would you participate in a survey on the EU referendum?
Please click here: [link to qualtrics survey]”
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in Northern Ireland. 3
The survey began with questions on demographics, interest in the EU
referendum, expectations about what would happen after the referen-
dum, vote choice, and attitude strength (’How sure were you about your
referendum vote choice?’). We then asked about respondents’ feelings
about the outcome of the referendum, whether they thought the decision
was final or whether they thought there might be a second referendum,
and what their most important sources of information about the refer-
endum were. Next, we asked about a few demographics (gender, age,
marital status, income) and assessed a few personality measures: the big
5 personality traits (we used the classic Ten-Item Personality Inventory,
Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann 2003), trust, self-esteem, subjective social
status (Adler and Steward 2007), 4 life satisfaction, need to evaluate, and
need for closure.
Next, subjects were randomly assigned to a treatment group (n=183) or
3278 UK residents completed the survey using links connected to their twitter ac-
counts. We received a few messages from individuals who had problems accessing their
individual links (mainly Safari users) or who wanted to re-tweet the link to the survey.
These individuals were sent an open link to the survey. To guarantee that no twitter
user took the survey twice we included a question asking for subjects’ twitter handles
in the open link version of the survey. 103 participants completed the survey using this
open link. Their twitter names were scanned for personal acquaintances. One personal
acquaintance and nine subjects not residing in the UK were excluded. The samples ac-
cessing the survey via individual links and the sample accessing it via the open link
were similar across the main political and demographic measures and were pooled.
4 The MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status was used to capture subjects’ per-
ception of their own social status across SES indivators. It shows a ten-step “social
ladder”; participants place themselves on of the ten steps. The description read: “Think
of this ladder as representing where people stand in the United Kingdom. At the top
of the ladder are the people who are the best off – those who have the most money, the
most education, and the most respected jobs. At the bottom are the people who are the
worst off – who have the least money, least education, and the least respected jobs or no
job. The higher you are on this ladder, the closer you are to the people at the very top;
the lower you are, the closer you are to the people at the very bottom. Where would
you place yourself on this ladder? (Please write below a number between 1 and 10.)”
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a control group (n=174). All respondents answered the Eurobarometer’s
three EU knowledge questions ("The EU currently consists of 28 member
states."; "The members of the European parliament are directly elected by
the citizens of each member state." and "Switzerland is a member state of
the EU."). The control group saw these questions in the same format as all
other questions; introduced as "True or False?". For the treatment group,
the same questions were introduced as a timed quiz. A clock started tick-
ing as soon as they reached the page. They had 35 seconds to answer the
questions. Because this treatment was designed as a subliminal stressor I
did not add any manipulation checks. I did, however, time the time spent
on the (timed or not timed) quiz as well as the time spent on the subse-
quent questions measuring belief in false campaign claims. The timed
version and the not timed version of the quiz is shown in figure A.2 in
the appendix.
Immediately after the stress manipulation participants were presented
with a battery of seven statements about the EU, and were asked to rate
how true or false they were. Four of these statements (the ones of in-
terest to this study) were factually incorrect campaign statements prop-
agated by the Leave campaign, and corrected by remain campaigners,
fact checkers and national and international public broadcasters: “Leav-
ing the EU frees up GBP 350m a week for the NHS.”; “If Britain had
remained in the EU it would have had to accept Turkish. membership.”;
“The EU could have forced British soldiers to join a European army.”;
“The EU could have made Britain join the Euro.”. The remaining state-
ments were distractor items. Two were correct: “The pound plunged to
its lowest level since 1985 after Britain voted to leave the EU”, and “All
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council areas in Scotland voted to remain”. The final statement had been
subject to speculation ever since it was reported in a tabloid: “The Queen
backs Brexit”.
The seven statements appeared in a random order. Respondents rated
each statement as “definitely true”, “probably true”, “probably false”,
“definitely false”, or “don’t know”. A hidden timer measured how long
subjects spent evaluating them. The survey ended with questions on
how much they thought they had in common with poeple who wanted
to leave and with people who wanted to remain (apart from what they
thought about Europe) and, finally, measures of curiosity, need for cog-
nition, and need for evaluation.
1.4 Results
As expected, the overwhelming majority of respondents were highly in-
terested in the referendum. 93 per cent of both leave and remain voters
were “very interested” in the EU referendum (see figure A.4a in the ap-
pendix). Contrary to expectations, the distribution of remain to leave
voters did not mirror the results of the referendum. 225 subjects, i.e. two
thirds of the sample reported they had voted to remain. 99 subjects had
voted to leave, 5 had not voted. Participants’ age ranged from 16 to 75;
most were in the 20s to 50s. As in the referendum results, the ratio of
leave voters to remain voters increased with age. Among participants in
their teens and twenties, less than a third voted to leave. In contrast, a
third of those in their thirties, a forth of those in their forties, and half of
those in their sixties and seventies reported to have voted to leave.
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Attitude strength was high: 93 per cent of leave voters and 95 per cent of
remain voters scored 5 or 6 on a 6-point slider question where 1 meant
’not sure at all’ and 6 meant ’absolutely sure’. Two thirds of leave vot-
ers saw no reasons at all or not very many reasons to remain, only two
per cent saw ’very many’ reasons to remain. Remain voters were even
more convinced of their cause: 90 per cent saw ’no reasons at all’ or ’not
very many reasons’ to leave; only one per cent saw ’very many’ reasons
to leave. Among leave voters the forecast for a post-Brexit Britain was
positive and testified to a high level of belief in the campaign’s promises:
59% of leave voters [versus 16% of remain voters] believed immigration
would be curbed after Brexit, 56% [1%] thought that the NHS would be
better off; 61% [2%] expected the general economic situation to improve,
and 25 % [1%] believed that that their personal financial situation would
improve as a result of Britain leaving the European Union.
The main independent variable was subjects’ assessment of five false
claims that had been spread by Leave campaigners. A simple additive
index was created to measure belief in these false facts. Each false claim
was converted to a numeric variable where ’Definitely true’ was assigned
a 5, “’Probably true’” a 4, “’Do not know’” a 3, “’Probably false’” a 2, and
“’Probably false’” a 1. The resulting additive index ranged from 5 (all five
statements rated as “definitely false”) to 20 (all five statements rated as
“definitely true”). The index was reliable (Cronbach’s α = .81(95 per cent
confidence interval: .77- 84) As expected, leave voters reported greater
levels of belief in false facts about the EU than did remain voters (cf. dis-
tribution in figure A.11b).
Contrary to expectations, the stress treatment had no effect on how Leave
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FIGURE 1.1: Belief in false facts by vote choice
voters evaluated these false claims. Figure 1.1 shows no difference be-
tween leave voters who had been exposed to time pressure and leave
voters who had not been exposed to time pressure. (Similarly, Remain
voters in the treatment group showed just about the same levels of be-
lief as remain voters in the control group.) Figure 1.2 shows the effect of
stress by attitude strength, where ’absolutely sure’ remain or leave voters
refer to those who ticked the maximum of 6 on a 0 (not at all) to 6 (ab-
solutely sure) scale). It shows that even the most convinced Leave and
Remain voters were unaffected by the stress treatment: the average level
of belief in false facts was almost the same in the treatment and remain
groups.
Next, I looked at the effect among a subgroups of leave voters who might
have been particularly drawn to the Leave campaign’s promises: subjects
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FIGURE 1.2: Belief in false facts about the EU by vote choice
and certainty about vote choice
who saw themselves in the lower echelons of society. To these individ-
uals, the status-boosting tone of the Leave campaign might have been
particularly appealing, which means that for them, in particular, the gut
reaction when confronted with these claims ought to be that they are true.
I test if these individuals were any more responsive to the stressors than
the general sample. To extimate the effect of those who were low in sub-
jective social status I created a dummy variable distinguishing between
subjects of low subjective social status (steps 1 to 5) and subjects of high
subjective social status (steps 6 to 10). Figure 1.4 shows slightly higher
levels of belief among low-status leave voters than among high-status
leave voters. (This can be traced back to differences in education). More
importantly, though, it shows small differences in how high and low-
status individuals respond to the stress treatment: Among those who see
themselves in the middle or at the bottom of Britain’s society, those who
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FIGURE 1.3: Belief in false facts about the EU by vote choice
and subjective social status
were exposed to time pressure show slightly higher levels of belief in the
false facts than their peers who were not exposed to any time pressure.
I looked at a few other personality measures and demographics to find
potential heterogeneous treatment effects. I found no significant effect of
gender, age, neuroticism, life satisfaction, generalised social trust, need
for cognition or need to evaluate on responses to stress.
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FIGURE 1.4: Belief in false facts about the EU by vote choice
and subjective social status
1.5 Discussion and Conclusion
This study set out to investigate the effect of a stress on motivated rea-
soning biases among leave voters. Results show no effect. I found no ev-
idence that the treatment that was designed to induce stress – time pres-
sure on a short quiz on the EU – impaired respondents’ ability to accu-
rately assess factually incorrect statements about the EU. For two reasons,
these null findings ought to be taken with a pinch of salt: First, the sample
was small, unrepresentative and unusually opinionated – among leave
voters levels of belief in these false facts were so high that at least some
of the non-effect may be due to ceiling effects. (Belief was too high for
the stressor to have an additional effect). More importantly, it is highly
likely that the stress manipulation was too weak. The sample was highly
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educated and had no difficulty answering the EU knowledge questions
correctly. Moreover, the time limit was too short: On average, treated
respondents spent 22 seconds answering these questions (sd=7); control
group respondents only spent marginally longer: Including outliers, con-
trol group respondents spent 32 seconds (sd=31), exluding those who
spent longer than 1.5 minutes the average was only 26 seconds (sd=17).
Hence, it is very probable that this treatment did not make respondents
feel rushed. It may even have made respondents more alert, acting as a
wake-up call in a long study. If so then the effect of this alertness may
have offset the effect of stress. Therefore, this study ought not to be seen
as a evidence that stress has no effect on belief in debunked facts. Future
research with a more stressful stress manipulation is needed.
Nonetheless, even this relatively un-stressful stressor did affect evalua-
tions among a few subpopulations. It never improved judgment. If it had
an effect, it impaired judgment. There were three groups of people who
showed higher levels of belief in the false facts under stress: individu-
als who were low in subjective social status, individuals who anticipated
their personal finances to get worse after Brexit, and individuals low in
self-esteem. Notably, this was true for Leave and Remain voters. (Among
the subset of Remain voters, generalised social trust and life satisfaction
also moderated the effect of the stress treatment on belief in false facts:
stressed Remain voters who were low in trust or low in life satisfaction
did significantly worse on average than unstressed remain voters who
were also low in trust or life satisfaction.) The factors that moderated
the effect of stress – feeling at the bottom of society, being less educated,
having worse jobs and less money, and expecting it all to get worse are
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signs of feeling left behind. Hence, this study points to a need for further





The effect of boosting in-group
identities on tolerance of false
facts
2.1 Abstract
Many recent electoral events have been characterised by false claims which,
despite abundant fact-checking, were often widely believed. This paper
asks why voters do not punish false facts in political campaigns. Building
on findings that suggests a link between status threat and Trump/Brexit
voting it investigates a simple hypothesis: That low group status or threat-
ened high group status makes voters susceptible to overlooking false
claims coming from politicians who boosts their group identities. A lab-
oratory experiment (n=277) was conducted to test this hypothesis. The
set-up was a pub-quiz style geography quiz. Unbeknownst to the par-
ticipants the likelihood of drawing easy or hard questions was varied so
that one team would do worse and receive a lower payoff than the other
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team. After the quiz, both teams were shown two pieces of feedback:
One person called the quiz ‘fair play’; the other person called it ‘unfair’
and demanded a pay rise for the disadvantaged team. One of the two
feedback givers were randomly assigned to make false claims. Results
showed that the disadvantaged overlooked false claims coming from the
person who sided with their team: There was no significant difference
in how disadvantaged team members rated the accurate and the inac-
curate version of the ’unfair’ feedback. If, however, the false facts came
from the person who sided with the advantaged team the disadvantaged
were more likely to notice the false facts: Those on the disadvantaged
team who saw the version of the ’fair play’ feedback that included false
claims were less agreed (p=0.02), thought it was less accurate (p=0.07),
and were slightly (but not significantly) less likely to rate its author as
a good team representative (p=0.22) than their peers who saw the factu-
ally accurate version. If generalisable to electoral campaigns these results
are sobering: If candidates recognize the disadvantage of those who feel
disadvantaged then lying will not cost them any votes among that group.
2.2 Introduction
Politics is not known to be the most ethical of professions. For the longest
time, a lie (or two) in a political speech did not raise an eyebrow. But in
2016, the amount of lies in political campaigns seemed to have crossed
a threshold: The factual inaccuracies in the UK’s Brexit campaign and,
subsequently, in Donald Trump’s election campaign led to a public out-
cry over politicians spreading false information. What is startling is that
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on both sides of the Atlantic the campaigns that were most accused of
making false or misleading claims carried away the elections: in June,
the Leave campaign won the EU referendum, having toured the United
Kingdom in a bus with a false figure of the the weekly cost of EU mem-
bership on it. In November, Donald Trump, whose claims about atten-
dance at his inauguration would lead to the coining of the infamous word
"alternative facts", won the White House. This project is about the citizen
voters confronted with false facts in political debates. It asks: Why would
voters vote for a candidate who makes claims that are, simply, false? This
paper suggests a link between low group status or threatened group sta-
tus and tolerance of false facts in political campaigns that side with one’s
in-group.
Both the Trump campaign and the Leave campaign argued that ’ordi-
nary citizens’, and the British or, respectively, the American people had
had the rough end of the stick for too long. Both campaigns appealed
to segments of their societies who were concerned about natives losing
jobs to immigrants, and promised to improve the status of natives rel-
ative to immigrants. Both campaigns also appealed to segments of the
British and American society who mourned the loss of Britain’s or Amer-
ica’s status in the world, and promised to recover a once-held and now
lost superior status of their nation. It seems that this campaign strategy
paid off: Voters who were concerned about the status of natives or the
loss of America’s or Britain’s status were more likely to vote for Trump,
or, respectively, Brexit. What did these voters make of the false claims in
these two campaigns? The motivated reasoning-informed hypothesis ad-
vanced in this paper is: nothing. They overlooked them. The hypothesis
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is simple: The mere feeling that the status of a group individuals identify
with is lower than it ought to be or lower than it used to be makes voters
susceptible to overlooking false facts coming from politicians who offer
positive social identity, for instance by recognizing a group’s hardship or
promising to improve their status.
A laboratory experiment is conducted to test the causal mechanism on a
non-political issue in a controlled laboratory setting at a UK university.
The focus is on low status groups: How do groups that are lower in status
react to false facts in statements from people who promise to raise their
group status?
2.3 Theoretical Background
This study borrows from two theoretical traditions: social identity the-
ory, and motivated reasoning theory. Social identity theory argues that
people make comparisons between not only themselves and others, but
between their groups and other groups. It is based on a number of group
experiments, in which subjects favoured in-groups and discriminated
against out-groups even if group assignment was as flimsy and unim-
portant as preference for a painter (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel 1982; Tajfel and
Turner 1986). Tajfel and Turner’s social identity theory assumes that part
of peoples’ self-image is based on group membership (this is their social
identity) and that groups are associated with (socially consensual) posi-
tive or negative value connotations. Comparing favourably with relevant
out-groups leads to high prestige and positive social identity; comparing
unfavourably leads to low prestige and negative social identity (Tajfel
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and Turner 1986, p. 40). The authors (Tajfel and Turner 1986) theorize
that individuals seek to achieve or maintain positive social identity: "The
aim of the differentiation is to maintain or achieve superiority over an
out-group on some dimensions." (Tajfel and Turner 1986, p. 41).
Unfavourable comparisons (i.e. negative social identity) are said to lead
to three types of behaviour: (1) individual mobility (leaving a group to
join a more positively distinct group), (2) social creativity (e.g. comparing
themselves on a different measure or with a different out-group, or rein-
terpreting characteristics formerly seen as inferior), or (3) social competi-
tion (fighting to improve the group’s negative image or position). Much
of social identity theory is concerned with the conditions under which
negative social identity generates conflict over scarce resources (cf. Tajfel
and Turner 1986, p. 44f and Tajfel 1974, p. 76f).
According to Tajfel and Turner’s theory, two types of groups are partic-
ularly prone to conflict: low-status groups who perceive the status dif-
ferences as unstable and/or illegitimate and high-status groups whose
higher status is threatened. Low status groups are competetive toward
the dominant group to the degree that "(a) subjective identification with
the subordinate group is maintained; and (b) the dominant group con-
tinues or begins to be perceived as a relevant comparison group" (Tajfel
and Turner 1986, p. 45). They are most likely to rise up if they are un-
able to join other groups (i.e. individual mobility is unavailable) and if
they perceive status difference as both unstable and illegitimate. (Tajfel
and Turner (1986, p.45) argued that this was probably the set of con-
ditions that underlay the development of ethnocentrism among Black
Americans, French Canadians, and New Zealand Maoris.) High-status
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groups whose high status is under threat are most likely to ’react in an
intensely discriminatory fashion’ to attempts by the subordinate group
to reverse their group status when they perceive their superiority as le-
gitimate (Tajfel and Turner 1986, p.45-46). This paper does not seek to
explain conflict. It takes a step back and considers the cognitive conse-
quences of low status and threatened high status in election campaigns.
On this front, Motivated Reasoning Theory offers helpful insights. It ar-
gues, as its name suggests, that "all reasoning is motivated": "people are
more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to arrive at" (Kunda
1987; Kunda 1990). Kahan (2016b, p.2) defines motivated reasoning as
"the tendency of individuals to unconsciously conform their assessment
of information to some goal collateral to determining its truth." Abundant
research confirms that individuals see information through an ideologi-
cal lens. (cf. also Fischle 2000; Bolsen, Druckman, and F. L. Cook 2015;
Kull, Ramsay, and Lewis 2003; Nyhan, Reifler, and Ubel 2013; Bartels
2002; Kahan 2016b; Westen et al. 2006). Lodge and Taber 2013 present
a number of experiments that provide consistent evidence that people
do not only defend their prior attitudes but that this happens outside of
conscious awareness: we know how we feel about a piece of information
before we know what we think of it. They theorize that conscious delib-
eration is but a way of rationalizing these unconscious processes to find
reasons why we feel the way we feel about something (Kraft, Lodge, and
Taber 2015, p.129).
Drawing on social identity theory and motivated reasoning theory this
paper assumes that (a) voters identify with groups, (b) voters have a need
to see their in-groups compare well with out-groups, and that (c) voters
2.3. Theoretical Background 49
are unable to assess information that threatens their in-group in an even-
handed way. This paper explores the cognitive side-effects of coping with
negative social identity – the feeling that one’s in-group does not compare
well with relative out-grous – in a political environment in which lying
politicians offer positive social identity. It suggests that the low or threat-
ened group status blurs the lens through which one sees politicians who
side with one’s in-groups.
The Trump campaign and the Brexit campaign seemed to appeal to peo-
ple who felt economically disadvantaged, or left behind. It also seemed
to appeal to people who felt that the status of their people was threat-
ened. This paper focuses on two types of status threat: Global status
threat (their country’s status in the world was under attack) and racial /
ethnic status threat (the status of ordinary (implied, white) citizens was
under attack).
2.3.1 Global Status Threat
Both campaigns addressed their electorate in terms of their national (British
or American) identity. On its own, this is unremarkable. What makes it
remarkable is that both campaigns presented their national identity as
being under threat. For instance, Nigel Farage, the key figurehead for
the Leave campaign declared that “We are British; we are not going to be
bullied by anybody" – implying that Britain had been bullied before (ITV
2016). Similarly, the slogan ’Take Back Control’ implied that Britain had
lost control. The same way, Donald Trump promised to ’Make America
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Great Again’, implying that America had lost at least some of its great-
ness. Trump’s campaign launch speech in New York City in June 2015
was a vivid example: 112 words into the speech, he declared "We don’t
have victories anymore. We used to have victories, but we don’t have
them" (Phillips 2017). In the same speech, Trump exclaimed that ’Sadly,
the American Dream is dead.’ – shattering an idea, the American Dream,
that is at the very heart of America’s national identity.
Both Trump and the Leave campaign offered a way out of the dilemma,
promising to free this besieged American or British identity. The Trump
campaign conveyed the impression that other nations, including China,
had trampled on America’s status in the world. The Brexit campaign con-
veyed the impression that the EU had trampled on Britain’s status in the
world. Both campaigns promised to un-do this injustice and to return
their nations to their rightful position as great nations (implied, better
than other nations). Given the history of the American and the British na-
tion it is unsurprising that this rhetoric fell on fertile ground: The Leave
campaign operated in a former (one might argue a fallen) empire, a for-
mer colonizer that has ceded at least some of its power to the European
Union; Trump spoke to a current superpower, the world’s largest econ-
omy and the mightiest military – but also a country that has tarnished its
image in the wars of the past few decades and is losing ground, politi-
cally and economically, to other rising powers – above all, China.
Populist campaigns beyond Britain and the US reveal similar patterns.
For instance, when Tayyip Erdoğan and Vladimir Putin address their di-
asporas in Europe they consistently depict their countries as belittled by
the West. The message they have been sending (be it in person or through
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their various state-controlled media channels) has been clear: their dias-
poras belonged to a great nation and ought to be proud of it. (And, to
express their Turkish or Russian identity, they ought to vote for them.)
Both Erdoğan and Putin have been surprisingly successful in gathering
support amongs their expat communities across continental Europe, in
particular in Germany, where the social and economic status of citizens
of Turkish and Russian decent tends to be below average.
2.3.2 Ethnic status threat
Trump and Brexit campaigners also appealed to people in terms of their
identity as ’ordinary’ citizens – which, at least in the US context, is often
understood to mean ’white’ (Tesler 2016b). Both campaigns bemoaned,
subtly or not so subtly, the declining status of white men.
For instance, the Leave campaign sided with ’working people’. In a 3
June 2016 interview, Michael Gove warned that "you can say, ’their con-
cerns don’t matter’ [...]. You can dismiss the concerns of working people.
[...] You are dismissing the concerns of working people." In good pop-
ulist fashion he continued, ’You’re on the side of the elites, I am on the
side of the people” Sky News 2016. Two weeks later (15 June), he pointed
directly at European immigrants: "At the moment all our public services
– the NHS and education are under strain, as a result of unlimited free
movement from the EU" BBC 2016. Meanwhile, Nigel Farage complained
that "it is wrong, wrong, wrong, that for average, decent families in this
country, their living standards have fallen by 10 per cent over the course
of the last few years. And it is about time [...] we started thinking about
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[...] not just about the rich getting richer, but about ordinary, decent
Britons who have got a rotten time. And they really have, too. " ITV
2016. Nigel Farage’s ’Breaking Point’ campaign poster was less subtle: It
showed a photograph of migrants crossing the Croatia-Slovenia border
in 2015. The only white person in it was obscured by a box of text, saying
’We must break free of the EU and take back control of our borders’ (see
Stewart and Mason 2016). Hence, leading Leave campaigners appealed
to voters in terms of their identity as ’working people’; they appreciated
their hardship, and they vowed to fight to improve their living standards.
Donald Trump’s rhetoric was similarly to the point. He promised to bring
back ’our’ jobs, ’our’ manufacturing (namely, Ford), and ’our’ military. In
his campaign launch speech Trump shouted, "We need money. (...) And
we need the right people." In the same speech he described his (mainly
White) audience as ’the best and the finest’, and contrasted them with
’the people Mexico sends. (...) they’re not sending their best. (...) They’re
bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists’ (Phillips 2017).
2.3.3 Status Threat and Vote Choice
Post-election research showed that perceived discrimination against whites
was indeed correlated with support for Brexit and Trump. Sides, Tesler,
and Vavreck (2018) examined British Election Study data. They found
that white voters who thought there was a lot of discrimination against
white people were over 60 percentage points more likely to support Brexit
than white voters who thought there was a lot of discrimination in favour
of white people in the UK (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018, p.216-217).
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Tesler (2016a) analysed the 2016 American National Election Pilot Study.
They found that in the US, whites who thought it was extremely likely
that “many whites are unable to find a job because employers are hiring
minorities instead” were over 50 points more likely to support Trump
than their country men and women who disagreed (Tesler 2016a). Fowler,
Medenica, and C. J. Cohen (2017) coined the term ’white vulnerability’:
"the perception that whites, through no fault of their own, are losing
ground to other groups". To measure it, the authors constructed a three-
item scale, asking whether whites were "economically losing ground through
no fault of their own"; whether discrimination against whites was "as big
a problem as that against Blacks and other minorities"; and whether mi-
norities overtaking whites as the majority of the U.S. population by 2050
would "strengthen or weaken the country." Controlling for the usual pre-
dictors of Trump support (e.g. partisanship, racial resentment, living in
the South, gender, and employment status) white vulnerability strongly
and significantly predicted support for Donald Trump. In the US, the
perception that whites are being discriminated against is growing; and it
is increasingly tied to voting Republican (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018,
p.170f). Americans who voted for Trump saw whites as more discrimi-
nated against than Muslims of black Americans (Edwards-levy 2016).
Naturally, none of these correlational studies can establish if white vul-
nerability, or status threat caused citizens to vote for Trump. However,
there are a few experimental and panel-data studies – and they do point
to a causal connection: First, and before the elections, Major, Blodorn,
and Major Blascovich 2016 found experimental evidence that remind-
ing whites that they would soon be outnumbered by non-whites made
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white Americans high in ethnic identification more supportive of Don-
ald Trump. (It also increased support for anti-immigrant policies and
opposition opposition to political correctness among this group.)
Second, and after the elections, Diana Mutz found panel data evidence
that rising white and global status threat made Americans shift toward
Trump. Mutz argued that white Americans were facing two types of sta-
tus threat: they were losing in numbers, and they were losing in global
status (the US is gradually losing its status as the number one world
power). As hypothesized, both types of perceived status threat led peo-
ple to vote for Trump: People who scored higher on social dominance
orientation in 2016 than they did in 2012 (a proxy for racial status threat)
were more likely to shift toward Trump. Similarly, people who saw China
as more threatening in 2016 than they did in 2012 and who grew less sup-
portive of free trade agreements in 2016 were more likely to shift toward
Trump.
2.3.4 Proposed mechanism
This paper suggests a causal connection between the kind of group status
threat many UK and US voters felt in 2016 (be it the status of ’ordinary’
people, ’white’ people, or the status of the ’American’ or ’British’ nation)
and the fact that they overlooked dubious information in campaigns that
promised to raise or recover their group status.
False claims coming from politicians who have boosted one’s in-group’s
status poses a dilemma: On the one hand, individuals have a need for
factual accuracy (Kunda 1990; Taber and Lodge 2006). On the other
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hand, according to social identity theory, they have a need for positive
group distinctiveness. Acknowledging that a politician is wrong about
one thing (e.g. that they don’t get their facts right) would mitigate the
positive effect of their status-boosting speech on in-group members’ so-
cial identity. If, as motivated reasoning research has shown, in-group
members are willing to sacrifice money to see their in-group fare better
than out-groups (Tajfel 1970) (and if, as history has shown, people sacri-
fice their lives in wars protecting their in-groups) it seems plausible that
they will – at least to some extent – sacrifice their need for factual accu-
racy as well.
Politicians can nudge group categorization by addressing individuals as
members of an in-group. They can nudge negative social identity by
pointing out to a low-status group ways in which they do not compare
well with relevant outgroups or by pointing out to high-status groups
that its higher status is threatened. (Both happened in 2016.) And then
they can alleviate these feelings of negative social identity. If, for in-
stance, politicians praise an in-group’s hard work, recognize their hard-
ship, or promise to improve their socio-economic standing relative to
other groups then they effictively provide a straw for in-group members
to clutch at. In-group members will want them to be right because they
have made them feel better about the groups they belong to. But what if
these political elites then say or do something that ought to set off alarm
bells? What if they use a piece of information that isn’t entirely true, or if
they advocate a political idea that you do not quite subscribe to, or if they
make an over-the-top statement about other groups? What if, ultimately,
they propagate political extremism or violence? The very beginning of
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this chain is politicians making benign but false claims. This paper sug-
gests, simply, that in-group members have a motivation to overlook such
false claims – not necessarly to believe them, but to overlook them.
This process ought to work at different levels of conscious awareness. At
a pre-conscious level individuals will simply not see or feel any signs of
fishiness. At a somewhat higher level of conscious awareness citizens
may sense something suspicious but may chose not to spend too much
time or too many thoughts on it. At an even higher level of awareness
people may sense the fishiness, look into the facts, acknowledge them
to be false, but decide to vote for the candidate nonetheless. Put differ-
ently, they will over-value the positive impact of the candidate’s identity-
justifying information and under-value the importance of his or her fac-
tual accuracy for their vote choice.
This does not negate the well-established research finding that people
do have accuracy goals (Kunda 1990; Taber and Lodge 2006). It does,
however, posit that people’s need for positive group distinctiveness (or
the need to recover lost status) exceeds their need for factual accuracy.
Citizens may not believe in everything their leaders say. But as long as
these leaders promise to boost their in-group’s low or lost status then the
nitty-gritty of their talk becomes irrelevant.
A laboratory experiment was designed to test the causal mechanism in a
non-political context focussing on economic differences. 1
1The oTree code is available here; the pre-registration is available here.








































































































In a 2*2 design, this study varied a) advantage or disadvantage at a money-
paying real effort task (a pub quiz-style geography quiz) and b) exposure
to false facts by a person siding with the advantaged or the disadvan-
taged team. The experiment began with a pub quiz-style geography quiz,
desigend to establish status differences. Subjects were randomly allo-
cated to an advantaged team (presented as ’Team A’) or a disadvantaged
team (presented as ’Team B’). Both teams answered 12 multiple-choice
geography questions (3 rounds * 4 questions). The questions were ran-
domly drawn from two sets of thirty questions: an easy set containing
questions such as ’What is the capital city of Germany?’ and a difficult set
containing questions such as ’What is the capital city of Liechtenstein?’.
Unbeknownst to the participants, the odds of drawing easy or difficult
questions varied by team. For each question, the advantaged team had an
eighty per cent chance of drawing an easy question, and a twenty per cent
chance of drawing a difficult question. The disadvantaged team had an
eighty per cent chance of drawing a difficult question, and a twenty per
cent chance of drawing an easy question. (Therefore, on average, the ad-
vantaged team would answer 9 easy questions and 3 difficult questions,
whereas the disadvantaged team would answer 9 difficult questions and
3 easy questions.) The quiz was timed: Participants had thirty seconds to
tick one of the four answers and hit a ’submit’ button. (If they failed to
submit their answer within thirty seconds they were automatically for-
warded to the next page.) After submitting each question and before
moving on to the new question respondents saw the respective question
for the other team (see page 137 in the appendix for example questions).
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The quiz was divided into three rounds with four questions each. After
each round players were shown summary statistics for that round: the
correct answers to both teams’ questions and, for each question, the per-
centage of respondents who submitted a correct answer. After the last
round, i.e. after 12 questions players were shown their own payoffs and
the mean payoffs for both teams (see page 138). Payoffs were designed to
depend on participants’ own performance as well as their teams’ perfor-
mance: Each correct answer was worth GBP 1.00. Participants kept half
of their earnings and contributed the other half to their team’s pot, which
was evenly divided amongst all group members. To mimic a pub quiz
group sizes were set at 4-8 team members.
Following the quiz, respondents were asked for feedback. (They received
three questions, asking if they thought any questions were too easy (i),
too difficult (ii), and what they thought about the thirty second time limit
(iii). Next, they were asked to consider two other people’s feedback. One
person’s feedback called the game ’fair play’, saying Team A (the advan-
taged team) had had the ’luck of the draw’ (see page 142); the other per-
son called the game ’unfair’, suggesting that Team B (the disadvantaged
team) be paid an additional GBP 5.00 on top of their payments (see page
145). Crucially, one of the two feedback pages were randomly assigned
to contain one false claim and one gross exaggeration. The false claim
stated that "Some of the places in that quiz don’t even exist." The exag-
gerated claim varied depending on team membership: If assigned to the
’unfair’ treatment, the last feedback point said the thirty seconds were
"barely enough time to read the questions." If assigned to the ’fair play’
treatment, it said they were "more than enough", and that "10 seconds
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would have been plenty." 2
This study attempted to capture tolerance of false facts on a spectrum
ranging from overlooking false claims to believing them. First, subjects
were asked if they ’generally agreed’ with both people’s feedback (see
page 145). Second, they rated to what extent both authors were ’factually
accurate’, and ’a good representative of my team’ (see page 145). (To dis-
guise the intent of the question participants were also asked to rate how
’educated’ the author was.) Third, respondents rated each point, includ-
ing the false claim, on a four-point scale from ’definitely true’ to ’defi-
nitely false’ (see page 145). The experiment ended with a short question-
naire (stage 4) including demographics and various control questions.
A difficulty that is inherent in studying respondents’ susceptibility to
overlooking false claims is that it is imperative that they see the false
claims (and do not just skim-read the treatment without noticing the false
claim). At the same time, one cannot make the false claim stand out too
much and one cannot simply ask by way of a manipulation test if they
read it. (Because printing a false claim in red letters or even just asking
if they read this claim would draw their attention to it. That of course
would defeat the purpose of measuring if they noticed it.) To maximise
the likelihood that respondents read the feedback it was kept short. The
four sentences that included a false claims were layouted as bullet points.
Hence, even skim-readers ought to at least have skim-read the false claim.
2NB: Informal feedback from participants on the advantaged team showed that the
exaggerated claim in the ’fair play’ feedback was slightly less exaggerated than in-
tended: Some of their questions were so easy that they did not need the entire 30 sec-
onds. (Nonetheless, 10 seconds would not have been enough to answer any of the
directions questions or the questions from the difficult set.) Generally, answers to the
open-ended feedback question about the time limit revealed that almost all respondents
thought 30 seconds was a fair limit.
2.3. Theoretical Background 61
False ’fair play’ False ’unfair’
Advantaged team 1 2
(Team A) n=69 n=64
Disadvantaged team 3 4
(Team B) n=83 n= 61
TABLE 2.1: Research Design - Study 1
A second difficulty that arises when respondents rate two different peo-
ple’s opinions is that they need to remember which person they are rat-
ing. Therefore, when respondents answered questions about either feed-
back they were able to scroll down to see the respective feedback.
2.3.6 Hypotheses
This experiment sought to create two status groups: an economically dis-
advantaged group and an economically advantaged group. The general
hypothesis depends on status: For the low-status group (the disadvan-
taged team), it was hypothesized that exposure to a message recogniz-
ing the team’s disadvantage and suggesting to raise their payoffs makes
team members overlook false claims by the source of the message. For the
threatened high-status group (the advantaged team), it was hypothesized
that exposure to a message legitimising their higher status makes team
members overlook false claims by the source of the message. The follow-
ing hypotheses will be tested across three dependent variables: general
agreement, rating the feedback as ’factually accurate’, and rating its au-
thor as a ’good team representative’.
Hypothesis 1 considers the hypothetical scenario in which a person who
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sides with your team either makes false claims or doesn’t: It is hypothe-
sized that factual accuracy has no effect on perceived suitability as a team
representative:
Hypothesis 1a: Disadvantaged team members who see a factually in-
accurate ’unfair’ feedback rate the author of the ’unfair’ feedback more
favourably than their peers who see a factually accurate ’unfair’ feed-
back.
Hypothesis 1b: Advantaged team members who see a factually inaccu-
rate ’fair play’ feedback rate the author of the ’fair play’ feedback more
favourably than their peers who see a factually accurate ’fair play’ feed-
back.
Hypothesis 2 considers the hypothetical scenario in which a person who
sides with the other team either makes false claims or does not. In this
case, it is hypothesized that in-group members will notice (and punish)
the false claims in the other camp:
Hypothesis 2a: Disadvantaged team members who see a factually inac-
curate ’fair play’ feedback rate the author of the ’fair play’ feedback more
favourably than their peers who see a factually accurate ’fair play’ feed-
back.
Hypothesis 2b: Advantaged team members who see a factually inac-
curate ’unfair’ feedback rate the author of the ’unfair’ feedback more
favourably than their peers who see a factually accurate ’unfair’ feed-
back.
Hypothesis 3 zooms in on the groups that were randomly assigned to see
false facts in the feedback that sided with their group (and no false facts
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in the other person’s feedback).
Hypothesis 3a: Those on the disadvantaged team who are exposed to a
false ’unfair’ feedback and an accurate ’fair play’ feedback will rate the
author of the (false) ’unfair’ feedback more favourably than the author of
the (accurate) fair play feedback.
Hypothesis 3b: Those on the advantaged team who are exposed to a false
’fair play’ feedback and an accurate ’unfair’ feedback will rate the (false)




The lab experiment was fielded to a convenience sample sample of 277
subjects at ESSEXLab, Colchester, UK in the summer of 2018 (June-Sep).
3 Subjects were recruited from ESSEXLab’s participants’ pool. 48 per cent
were undergraduate students; 62 per cent female, 54 per cent British. 4
3Results presented here exclude a first round with 264 participants, conducted June
5th-7th, 2018. The first round showed the disadvantaged group was slightly more toler-
ant of facts by the person who recognized their in-groups’ hardship than by the person
who called the game ’fair play’. In contrast, the advantaged game was slightly more
likely to tolerate false facts in the ’unfair’ feedback than in the ’fair play’ treatment.
However, group differences were far from statistical significance. Post-experimental
feedback from individual participants suggested that the null results stemmed from
cognitive overload: the treatment, that is, the two feedback pages were fairly long
(around 11 lines), and many participants only skim-read them. What is more, there
was no ’back’ button so that participants who did not read the feedback pages were
unable to refer back to them as they were answering questions about the two feed-
back givers. Two measures had been taken to ensure participants knew which feedback
they were rating: First, respondents were shown each feedback before they were asked
questions about ("As you will remember, this was feedback 1/2. (...)". Second, each
feedback was assigned a colour, which was not associated with any particular political
party: The ’fair play’ feedback and all questions about it were shown on a teal-coloured
background, whereas the ’unfair’ feedback and all questions about it were shown on a
beige background. Because these measures proved to be insufficient two further mea-
sures were taken before the study was re-run: First, to encourage respondents to read
the feedback in the first place both feedback pages were shortened; important sentences
were printed in bold, and the feedback points that contained false or exaggerated claims
were formatted as bullet points. Second, to ensure respondents knew which feedback
they were rating and could refer back to it if they had not read it they were shown the
feedback on two of the three pages on which they were asked questions about it. Hence,
when answering if they generally agreed with a feedback and when assessing how true
or false each individual claim was respondents were able to scroll down to view the
respective feedback, introduced as: "For your reference, this was feedback 1:". The feed-
back was not however reprinted on the second page, asking if ’The points this person
makes are factually accurate’ and if ’This person is a good representative of my team.’
These questions were intended to measure to what extent subjects pre-contiously over-
looked the false claims. In this case, showing the feedback again would have allowed
respondents to check how factually accurate the feedback was and, thereby, would have
defeated the purpose of the question.
434% postgraduate students, 10% administrative staff, 3% faculty, 84% affilated with
the University of Essex, mean age=31 years (min age=19 years, max age=80 years, two
thirds in their twenties), 54% British (15% Eastern European, 6% Southern European,
4% Western European).
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(A) Rating the ’unfair’ feedback
(B) Rating the ’fair play’ feedback
FIGURE 2.4: Disadvantaged team
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FIGURE 2.5: Disadvantaged players who saw false claims
in the ’unfair’ feedback (group 4) rating the (false) ’unfair’
feedback and the (correct) ’fair play’ feedback
Table 2.1 shows the number of participants in each group: 133 partici-
pants were randomly assigned to the advantaged team. 69 of them saw
false claims as part of the feedback that called the game ’fair play’; 64 saw
false claims as part of the feedback that called it ’unfair’. 144 participants
were assigned to the disadvantaged team. 83 of them saw false claims in
the ’fair play’ feedback; 61 saw false facts in the ’unfair’ feedback. 5
In all sessions, the average payoffs for advantaged players exceeded that
of the disadvantaged. Advantaged team players earned GBP 8.90 (min=GBP
5.75, max=GBP 11.80) on average; disadvantaged players earned GBP
5(Due to a mistake one session was larger with 9 participants on the advantaged
team and 10 on the disadvantaged team.)
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(A) Rating the ’fair play’ feedback
(B) Rating the ’unfair’ feedback
FIGURE 2.6: Advantaged team
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FIGURE 2.7: Advantaged players who saw false claims in
the ’unfair’ feedback (group 1) rating the (false) ’unfair’
feedback and the (correct) ’fair play’ feedback
4.80 (min=GBP 2.25, max=8.40)). 6 7 A large majority (260/277) of play-
ers correctly remembered that on average, Team A had received a higher
payoff than Team B.
Did players notice the false claim? Did they punish it? Three ques-
tions were asked to assess to what extent players noticed, or overlooked
this false claim: On a first page, respondents were asked if they agreed:
’Generally speaking, do you agree with the author of this feedback?’
(1=’Strongly Disagree’, 2=’Disagree’, 3=’Slightly Disagree’, 4=’Slightly
Agree’, 5=’Agree’, 6=’Strongly Agree’). Next, respondents were to rate
6Calculated payoffs differed from paid payoffs in two instances: First, because of a
minimum payoff policy respondents who earned less than GBP 5.00 (n=78) were paid
GBP 5.00. Second, due to maintenance problems two studies started 5 and 10 minutes
late, respectively. Subjects in those studies received a GBP 1.00 or GBP 2.00 top-up to
compensate for their extra time.
7The difference in payoffs varied quite substantially: In two sessions, it was less
than 1 GBP (0.21 and 0.80, respectively). This was mainly due to the fact that the game
manipulated the chances of drawing easier or more difficult questions, not the numer of
questions.
2.3. Theoretical Background 69
the author of each feedback along three dimensions: education (a dis-
tractor), factual accuracy (’The points this person makes are factually ac-
curate’), and suitability as a team representative (’This person is a good
representative of my team.’). All three questions were measured on a
scale from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very). Due to space contraints the results
reported here below focus mainly on suitability as a team representative;
the full results are shown in the appendix.
Figure 2.4 shows results for the hypotheses for the disadvantaged team
(1a, 2a, and 3a). Figure 2.6 show results for the advantaged team (1b,
2b, and 3b). Beige bars represent ratings of the ’unfair’ feedback; teal-
coloured bars represent ratings of the ’fair play’ feedback.
The main question this project sought to answer was: Do players over-
look false facts that appear in the feedback that sides with their team? As
hypothesized, they do. Figure 2.4 shows evidence for the disadvantaged
team: It compares how the disadvantaged team rated the accurate ver-
sion of the ’unfair’ feedback ("no false facts") and the inaccurate version
of it ("false facts"). For each evaluation the graph shows two bars, repre-
senting those who saw (and rated) the accurate version ("no false facts")
and the inaccurate version of it ("false facts"). As expected, there is abso-
lutely no difference between the two groups. Whether a disadvantaged
member saw an accurate version of the ’unfair’ feedback or a version
with false claims in it had absolutely no effect on how they evaluated
it. Those on the disadvantaged team who rated an ’unfair’ feedback that
contained false claims gave it an average rating of 66/100. Their peers
who rated the factually accurate version of the same feedback gave it a
mere two points more (68/100). The difference in means was far from
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statistical significance (t(131)=-0.53, p = 0.59). (The results for the other
two dependent variables are shown in the appendix.)
The same was true for the advantaged team: As shown in figure 2.6 those
on the advantaged team who rated a ’fair play’ feedback that contained
false claims evaluated it just as favourably as their peers who had seen
the factually accurate version of it. Those on the advantaged team who
rated a ’fair play’ feedback that contained false claims gave it an average
rating of 45. Their peers who rated the factually accurate version of the
same feedback gave it an average representation rating of 47. Again, this
two point-effect of factual accuracy was far from significance (t(123)=-
0.24, p = 0.80).
Hypotheses 1a and 1b are therefore confirmed. Factual accuracy has no
effect on how players rate the feedback that favours their team. This
finding implies that the effect of lying – or not lying – on individuals’
chances as being seen as a good representative are negligeable.
What about false claims in the other camp? Do players notice and punish
false facts that appear in the feedback that favours the other team? The
disadvantaged do (at least a little); the advantaged do not. The middle
graph in figure ?? shows evidence for the disadvantaged team, compar-
ing ratings of the ’no false facts’ and the ’false facts’ version of the feed-
back that favoured the other team. It shows that the disadvantaged were
generally less agreed with the author of the inaccurate ’fair play’ feed-
back; they rated them as less accurate and an (even) worse representative
than the author of the accurate version of it. However, only the difference
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in general agreement reached statistical significance at a 95 per cent con-
fidence interval; the difference in accuracy ratings reached significance at
a 90 per cent confidence interval (see appendix). The difference in rep-
resentation ratings (42 v. 48/100, on average) did not reach significance
(t(135)=-1.23, p = 0.22). This is suggestive, but not conclusive evidence –
Hypotheses 2a cannot be confirmed.
When it comes to the advantaged team the data is clear : Contrary to hy-
potheses there is no evidence that the advantaged punished the person
who favoured the other team for lying. Advantaged team membes gave
the ’unfair’ feedback accuracy ratings in the lower 60s and representa-
tion ratings in the mid-40s – regardless of whether or not that feedback
contained false claims . Hence, hypothesis 2b is rejected.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 examined counterfactual situations in which a po-
tential representative either makes false claims or does not make false
claims. Hypothesis 3 examines a more common situation: one in which
one person lies and another person tells the truth. If the lying person is
the one who favours an out-group then in-group members have every
incentive to notice the lies. But what if the lying person is the one who
favours one’s in-group? Half the players in this experiment were nudged
to be motivated reasoners: Those who saw false claims as part of the feed-
back that favoured their team (groups 1 and 4 in table 2.1). If motivated
reasoning extends to overlooking false claims then these ought to turn a
blind eye to the false claims and rate the feedback that favours their own
team more favourably than the feedback on the other side. That is exactly
what they did.
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As shown in graph of figure 2.5, disadvantaged players who saw a ly-
ing feedback favouring them and an honest feedback favouring the other
team showed significantly higher levels of agreement with the former
than the latter. They rated it as slightly (but not significantly) more accu-
rate, and deemed its author a much better team representative than the
author of the feedback that favoured the opposing team (Mcorrect ’fair play’=48/100,
Mfalse ’unfair’=66/100, t(87)=-3.66, p = 0.00.).
The same was true for the advantaged team: As shown in figure 2.7 those
who were nudged to be motivated reasoners, that is, those who were
confronted with a ’fair play’ feedback that contained false claims and an
’unfair’ feedback that did not contain any false claims evaluated the for-
mer a better team representative than the latter: Mcorrect ’unfair’=45/100,
Mfalse ’fair play’=64/100, t(132)=4.58, p = 0.00. This confirms hypotheses 3a
and 3b.
2.4 Discussion
This laboratory study was designed to test the effect of boosting in-group
status on tolerance of false facts among the in-group. It asked two main
research questions: First, do groups that are economically disadvantaged
relative to other groups overlook false facts by leaders who recognize
their disadvantage and who promise to improve their group’s relative
status? Second, do advantaged groups that fear losing their advantage
overlook false facts by leaders who justify their group’s advantage and
promise to maintain it? The core of the experiment was a pub quiz-like
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geography quiz in which the chances of receiving easy or difficult ques-
tions were manipulated: One (advantaged) team had a higher chance of
receiving easier questions, and therefore a higher average payoff than
the other (disadvantaged) team. After the quiz, respondents were ex-
posed to two people’s feedback. One person called the quiz ’unfair’;
the other called it ’fair play’. One of the two feedback pages was ran-
domly assigned to include a false claim, complaining that "some of the
places don’t even exist", and an exaggerated claim, complaining that the
thirty second time limit was too short (’barely enough time to read the
question’) or, if assigned to the ’fair play’ feedback, too long (’10 seconds
would have been plenty’).
Hypothesis 1 examined the (counterfactual) scenario in which a person
who favours one’s in-group either makes false claims or does not make
any false claims. As hypothesized, it didn’t affect their standing: Both the
disadvantaged and the advanted agreed with the feedback that favoured
their team, evaluated their author as a good team representative and
stated that ’the points this person makes are factually accurate’ – regard-
less of whether they were accurate or not. This finding confirms recent
findings that loyalty trumps honesty Hildreth and Anderson (2018) Im-
plications for political campaigns are sobering: If grossly exaggerating or
making false claims does not affect perceived leadership qualities then
politicians have no incentive not to lie. As long as they are loyal to their
target in-group and as long as their target in-group is large enough to win
them the election they will get elected.
Hypothesis 2 examined the (counterfactual) scenario in which a person
who favours the other team either makes false claims or does not make
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any false claims. In this case, it was hypothesized that players would
notice and punish those false claims. Results are inconclusive. The dis-
advantaged team showed some signs of sanctioning lies in the opposing
team; the advantaged team showed no signs at all. On average, the dis-
advantaged team ’slightly agreed’ with the accurate ’fair play’ feedback.
They ’slightly disagreed’ with the inaccurate ’fair play’ feedback. Here,
the difference in means was statistically significant (see results in the ap-
pendix). When asked to assess how accurate the feedback was they gave
the accurate feedback a score of 60, and the inaccurate feedback a score of
50. Here, the difference was significant at a 90 per cent confidence inter-
val (p=0.07, see appendix). Yet when it came to evaluating how apt the
person was to act as a team leader respondents seemed to care a little less
about how honest they were: The disadvantaged rated the author of the
incorrect ’fair play’ feedback as slightly, but not significantly less accurate
and as a slightly, but not significantly worse team representative than the
author of the accurate version of the ’fair play’ feedback.
Hence, hypothesis 2 could not be confirmed. For two reasons, these (par-
tially) null findings ought to be taken with a grain of salt: First, there were
clear signs that the disadvantaged rated the feedback that favoured the
advantaged less favourably when it contained false facts. The fact that
group differences did not reach significance across all indicators ought
to be seen as a reflection of the small sample size. A larger sample size
would most probably have pushed the them toward significance. Sec-
ond, and more importantly, there was a flaw in the design. Somewhat
unfortunately, the false claims were not ’neutral’. The statement that
’some of these places don’t even exist’ was clearly false. However, it
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implied that the game was rigged – and members of the disadvantaged
team must have felt cheated. This claim recognized their hardship – even
if it appeared as part of the ’fair play’ feedback. Future research ought to
investigate reactions to more ’neutral’ false claims.
Similarly, the fact that the advantaged team let false facts in the ’fair play’
feedback slide should not be interpreted as final evidence that status
threat does not affect the way individuals evaluate a person who favours
the out-group. It is likely to the failure of this study to credibly threaten
team A’s status.
Hypothesis 3 zoomed in on those who were nudged to be motivated rea-
soners. The disadvantaged behaved as expected: They rated the lying
’unfair’ person as a far better team representative and as slightly more
accurate than the honest ’fair play’ person. If generaliseable to election
campaigns this is consequential. In our experiment voters did not have
to choose between two candidates – in real elections they do. This makes
it all the more likely that they will overlook false facts. Therefore, these
results suggest that if voters who identify with a low-status group have
the choice between a candidate who wants to raise their group status but
lies and a candidate who wants to maintain the status quo and is honest
then they will overlook the false claims and vote for the former.
The high-status group behaved in the same way: Advantaged players
who saw a ’fair play’ feedback that contained false claims rated the au-
thor of that ’fair play’ feedback as a better team representative (albeit not
as more accurate) than the author of the (correct) ’unfair’ feedback. This,
too, is alarming. When voters who identify with a high-status group have
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the choice between a candidate who promises to maintain their relatively
higher status and a candidate who wants to level out status differences
they, too, will overlook the false claims and elect the candidate on their
side.
Two limitations ought to be noted. The main caveat concerns the advan-
taged group. This study was designed to create a low status group and
a threatened high-status group. It did create status differences. The low
status group’s low status was built up during a twelve-question quiz that
culminated in a very low payoff – on average, four pounds lower than the
other team’s payoff and, in many cases lower than the minimum payoff.
(Which made them eligible for the lab equivalent of welfare benefits; i.e.
the un-earned minimum payoff of GBP 5.00). The advantaged group’s
higher status was similarly consolidated: Their success was consolidated:
They beat the other team across most of the twelve questions, and made
more than they may have expected to make in a 30-minute study. How-
ever, the attempt to threaten the high status group’s relatively higher sta-
tus seems to have been less successful. The status threat depended en-
tirely on a few sentences in the ’unfair’ feedback: The demand to top up
Team B’s payoffs was assumed to act as a status threat to Team A. This
is unlikely to have worked. The advantaged group had nothing to lose:
their own payoffs were safe and even in the unlikely event that the ex-
perimenter had topped up team B’s payments they were still part of the
winning team. It is very likely that the threat to their higher status did
not felt very real. Future studies ought to create a more realistic sense of
status threat, ideally coming from above, not from a fellow participant.
A second caveat is the small sample size. Larger studies are needed to
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detect small effects and heterogenous treatment effects. In particular, the
sample size was too small to examine the effect of status-boosting speech
among players who according to social identity theory were most likely
to engage in violence: those who strongly identified with their team, who
thought status differences were illegitimate and who believed it was pos-
sible that the status differences that resulted from the quiz might be over-
turned. (I would expect these players to be particularly immune to false
claims in the feedback on their side.)
2.5 Conclusion
This study contributes to research in an important way: It showed that
low status makes individuals vulnerable to overlooking factual inaccura-
cies in statements from people who sympathize with their group. In light
of the rising levels of inequality in Western Democracies and the rise of
populist leaders appealing to voters who believe to be socially or eco-
nomically disadvantaged this is important to know. If feeling disadvan-
taged makes voters vulnerable to overlooking false facts in campaigns
that promise to raise their status then it is unlikely that the present tide of
populist politicians with agendas that are based on facts dubious quality
will turn.
This laboratory experiment was designed to test a causal mechanism. As
with any laboratory study the flipside of isolating the mechanism in a
controlled lab environment is that the setting deviates from a real-world
setting. For external validity, the next step in this research avenue is to
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test this mechanism in a setting that is closer to the everyday life of dis-
advantaged voters. For instance, online survey experiments could ma-
nipulate low group status and then expose respondents to a hypothetical
election in which one campaign recognizes their hardship and seeks to
level out inequality. It could vary the factual accuracy of their campaign
promises.
In addition, more research is needed on the effect of status threat. Both
laboratory and survey experiments could be used to test if status threat
makes voters vulnerable to overlooking false facts: Do voters who be-
lieve to have lost in status or who fear losing status overlook false facts
from politicians who promise to move their group up again? Here, too
survey experiments around hypothetical elections are a promising route
for future research. Future studies could try to nudge feelings of ethnic
or global status loss and investigate the effect of that feeling on tolerance
of false facts in political campaigns.
Future studies should also tease out the effect of status threat and sta-
tus boost: Is threatening status sufficient to make voters overlook false
claims? Is boosting status sufficient? How do the two interact? What are
the minimal conditions under which voters overlook false facts? Could
in-group membership or siding with the right team be a sufficient condi-
tion? In this case, If none of the teams had been disadvantaged and if both
teams had had the same payoff would team members still have over-
looked false claims from a person who sided with their team? If so, how
far does this willingness stretch: Would minimal (e.g. Klee/Kandinsky)
groups do the trick, too?
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In addition, future studies should investigate the effect of perceived status
differences: Do subject who believe to be disadvantaged but are not ac-
tually disadvantaged also overlook false claims by leaders who promise
to raise their group status or fight off threats to it? Exploratory analyses
from this study suggest that the driving factor is not actual disadvantage
but perceived disadvantage: Because this study varied the likelihood of
receiving difficult or easy questions (but not the number of difficult or
easy questions) the level of advantage and disadvantage differed across
the games. Both the somewhat disadvantaged and the very disadvantaged
overlooked false claims in the feedback that favoured their team. (This
question could easily be answered in a variant of these experiments in
which both teams receive the same number of easy and difficult ques-
tions; and a flat payoff.)
Finally, scholars ought to investigate the extent to which voters tolerate
false claims coming from a person who recognizes their struggles: If they
are willing to support someone who makes false but benign claims are
they also willing to support them if the claims become less benign? For
instance, will they continue to support their candidate if the candidate
makes derogatory comments about out-group members, if they condone
violence against out-group members, or, ultimately, if they incite vio-
lence?
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Investigating the Mechanisms of
Resistance to Factual Correction
3.1 Abstract
Many recent electoral events have been characterised by false claims which,
despite abundant fact-checking by experts were apparently widely be-
lieved. This led to much talk about ’post-truth’ politics. An extensive
literature confirms that political misperceptions often resist correction.
But how strong is this tendency? We conducted a representative sur-
vey experiment in Britain (N=2900) testing belief in common mispercep-
tions about immigration. We followed the classic setup of misperception-
correction studies but added a twist: First, we identified false beliefs and
provided expert information countering one of those false beliefs. Sec-
ond, we approximateed ‘real world’ conditions, where expert informa-
tion is rarely the final word. Respondents in our treatment group saw a
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’comment’ saying ‘I would take these statistics with a big pinch of salt’.
We varied two things: who made the comment (an authoritative or a non
authoritative source) and the reason they gave to take the statistics with
a pinch of salt. Our results show that the fact checks worked: Whenever
the expert had the final word average perceptions shifted from just below
’definitely true’ to just above ’don’t know’. However, the post-truth com-
ments worked, too: Whenever the commentator had the final word aver-
age perceptions remained well within the ’true’ side of our ’true’ to ’false’
scale, albeit closer to false than before they had seen the fact check. Our
findings illustrate the relevance of fact-checking false claims in a post-
truth era.
3.2 Introduction
’Facts don’t work.’ This was the advice Arron Banks, co-founder of the
Leave.EU campaign received from the political strategists Goddard Gun-
ste. They heeded the advice. In an interview with the Guardian, Banks
explained how the Leave campaign differed from the Remain campaign:
’The Remain campaign featured fact, fact, fact, fact. It just doesn’t work.
You’ve got to connect with people emotionally. It’s the Trump success.’
(Booth, Travis, and Gentleman 2016). Throughout the campaign, news-
papers, public broadcasters, and independent charities fact checked the
arguments, the statistics, and the projections made on both sides. In par-
ticular, fact checkers went to great lengths to correct one false claim that
adorned the bus in which the Leave campaign toured the country: ’We
send the EU £350m a week. Let’s fund the NHS instead.’ Numerous
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journalists explained Margaret Thatcher’s rebate, and laid out why even
the amount Britain actually transferred to the EU could not simply be
re-directed to the NHS. Even the UK Statistics Authority intervened, say-
ing the figure was misleading (Henley 2016; Reuben 2016; Arnold 2016;
Full Fact 2017). Nonetheless, the false figure remained on the bus, lead-
ing leave campaigners continued to repeat the false claim (Stewart and
Asthana 2018), and on 23 June 2016, Britain voted to leave the European
Union. Two years after the referendum, a representative survey found
that 42 per cent of those who had heard the 350 million claim believed it
was true (Stone 2018). The unwillingness of the leave campaign to refrain
from using an incorrect statistic and the share of the public who think this
number is correct points to a puzzle: If politicians at the highest levels of
government disregard expert advice and encourage voters to do the same
(Watts 2016) then who will voters trust? Is fact checking worth the effort?
Francis Fukuyama described the ’post-fact world’ as a world in which
’virtually all authoritative information sources are called into question
and challenged by contrary facts of dubious quality and provenance’
(Fukuyama 2017). This paper is about the citizen consumers of authorita-
tive information called into question by contrary facts of dubious quality
and provenance. It contributes to a nascent body of literature investi-
gating the effect of a post-truth context 1 on political behaviour. We ask:
How does exposure to post-truth comments shape the way that we pro-
cess challenging factual information? If expert information suggests we
1@Rob & John: I am still not sure how to call this. Post-truth surroundings? Context?
Arguments? Era?
84 Chapter 3.
are wrong but others put forward essentially fact-free arguments coun-
tering the expert information whom do we believe? The expert whose in-
formation is accurate but challenges our beliefs or the non-expert whose
information is of dubious quality but affirms our beliefs? And what if the
non-expert is an authoritative person?
A large body of literature in the motivated reasoning tradition has shown
that humans are biased information processors, pursueing not only accu-
racy goals but also directional goals: "People are more likely to arrive
at conclusions that they want to arrive at" (Kunda 1990). We specu-
late that where accuracy goals compete with directional goals post-truth
surroundings might tilt the balance toward the latter. In other words,
we expect post-truth comments to nudge individuals to ignore the ex-
pert and retain their old beliefs. We explored these questions using a
representative-sample survey experiment in Britain (N=2,936). We chose
a topic British voters on both sides of the Brexit debate feel strongly
about: immigration. We aimed high, investigating the effect of not just
any fact check but a fact check that respondents thought was true and
which affirmed their stance on immigration. We began by asking respon-
dents to rate four false claims about immigration on a scale from 0 (Def-
initely false) to 6 (Definitely true). Two false statements were catered to
respondents who held pro-immigration opinions and two were catered
to respondents who held anti-immigration opinions. We then directed
respondents to a fact check correcting the false claim they had rated clos-
est to ’true’.
We had three main goals: First, we sought to find if the fact checks af-
fected respondents’ perceptions of how true or false the false claim were.
3.2. Introduction 85
Hence, we asked respondents to re-rate the false claims after they had
seen the fact check. To capture smaller changes in perceptions we de-
parted from the classic dichotomous ’true’ or ’false’ question, and asked
respondents to rate the claims on a scale from 0 (Definitely false) to 6 (Def-
initely true). Second, we explored how robust the effect of the fact check
(if any) was to post-truth comments. To that end, we showed four out of
five respondents an extra piece of information before we asked them to
re-rate the false claims: a ’comment’, saying ”I would take these statistics
with a pinch of salt’. In a 2*3 design we varied the authoritativeness of
the post-truth commenter (’Professor of Economics’ / ’Blogger’) and the
reason why they said they would take the statistics with a grain of salt.
In one variant, the commenter argued that the expert was probably bi-
ased, in another variant they pointed out that the expert’s statistics did
not match people’s everyday experience. In the third variant the com-
ment did not doubt the expert information at all, saying that it was best
to trust one’s feelings even if it looks like the facts are different. Our final
goal was to explore evidence of a post-truth mindset. At the end of the
survey, we asked a few questions explicitly testing whether respondents
agreed with classic post-truth arguments.
Our results showed that fact checks successfully reduced misperceptions.
On average, respondents placed the false facts closer to ’false’ after they
saw the fact-check than before they saw it. This was the case for respon-
dents on both sides of the immigration debate (those wanting to reduce
immigration and those wanting to maintain current levels of immigra-
tion or increase them). The fact check did not cause a complete u-turn:
respondents did not shift from rating the false claim as ’true’ to rating
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it as ’false’. But the effect was substantial: It reduced misperceptions by
almost two (1.75) points on the seven-point scale. Before respondents
saw the fact check, the average veracity rating was just a point below ’6
- Definitely true’ (5.1). After they saw the fact check, it was just above
the midpoint between ’0 - Definitely false’ and ’6 - Definitely true’ (3.4).
Hence, the fact check shifted respondents from being almost absolutely
sure the false fact was true to almost admitting they did not know if it
was true or false.
As hypothesized, exposure to post-truth comments mitigated the effect
of the expert statement on respondents’ perceptions of how true or false
the false claims were. The post-truth comment canceled out a small but
significant part of the fact check: about half a point, or a third or the
1.75 point effect. Contrary to our expectations, authoritativeness did not
moderate the effect of the post-truth comment: Our post-truth professor
was not any more convincing than our post-truth blogger. The reason
why they said they would ’take those statistics with a pinch of salt’ did
not seem to matter either. Arguing that an expert was biased was just as
effective as arguing that their statistics did not match people’s everyday
experience or that their statistics were probably right but when in doubt,
it is best to trust one’s feelings. Overall, these findings are reassuring:
Expert opinion mitigates misperceptions even if the expert does not have
the ’final word’.
Nonetheless, we found a level of agreement with post-truth arguments
that supports the notion a post-truth public. We asked respondents to
rate the statement they had rated as true and read a fact check about on a
scale from ’0 - Purely a matter of fact’ to ’6 - Purely a matter of opinion’.
3.3. Reactions to uncongenial expert information 87
Among the control group (that is, among respondents who skipped the
post-truth comment) only 17 per cent evaluated the fact-checked state-
ment as ’purely a matter of fact’. 35 per cent deemed it closer to a matter
of opinion than a matter of fact (4, 5, or 6); 13 per cent saw it as ’purely a
matter of opinion’. Next, we asked if the statistics were in line with what
they believed. If the answer was ’no’ we followed up, asking respondents
to choose one of three statements to describe where they stood. About a
third (32%) said ’The statistics made me change my mind.’ Another third
(36%) said ’The statistics are probably wrong.’ A third third (32%) said
’The statistics are probably right but I believe something different’. Fi-
nally, we asked respondents what they thought of the statement that ’It’s
OK to disagree with the facts if that’s what you believe.’ 46 per cent
agreed. 18 per cent strongly agreed.
3.3 Reactions to uncongenial expert information
A large body of social science literature testifies to the fact that misper-
ceptions tend to resist correction. It has long been known that individuals
often continue to rely on information even after it has been retracted or
proven wrong (Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard 1975; Carretta and Moreland
1983; Wyer and Budesheim 1987). Individuals are particularly unlikely
to accept information that challenges factual beliefs they feel strongly
about or that are tied to their identity (Kull, Ramsay, and Lewis 2003;
Thorson 2016; Jacobson 2010; Hart and Erik C. Nisbet 2012; Nyhan, Rei-
fler, and Ubel 2013; Nyhan, Reifler, Richey, et al. 2014; Kraft, Lodge,
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and Taber 2015; Thorson 2015; Rampell 2016). The drivers of this re-
sistence to counter-attitudinal facts are well-known: Human beings are
motivated reasoners. We engage with new information with a motiva-
tion to reach a particular conclusion: We pursue not only accuracy goals
but also partisans, or directional goals (Kunda 1990; Kahan 2016b; Kahan
2016a; Lodge and Taber 2013; Kraft, Lodge, and Taber 2015). Brain imag-
ing studies suggest that a proclivity to motivated reasoning is hard-wired
in our brains. For instance, Westen et al. (2006) found that the areas of
partisans’ brains responsible for reasoning shut down when they looked
at information that was threatening to their own candidate. In contrast,
when they were considering consonant information, the emotional areas
of their brains lit up. The results is ’fact polarization’: Voters find them-
selves divided over questions of fact – an issue Kahan (2016b) called ’one
of the signature features of contemporary democratic political life’.
Our study investigates if exposure to post-truth comments exacerbates
fact polarization. The idea is simple: If information that challenges polit-
ical opinions sets off an internal battle between accuracy and directional
goals then seeing someone else doubt the statistics ought to tilt the bal-
ance in favour of the directional goals. As long as individuals have a
strong enough motivation to reject the evidence then even weak argu-
ments, no arguments, or fact-free arguments ought to work as a nudge to
maintain one’s prior beliefs.
Our study contributes to a growing body of literature on poltical misper-
ceptions. Much of this research has focused on finding ways to commu-
nicate political information more effectively (see Seifert 2002; J. Cook and
Lewandowsky 2011; Nyhan and Reifler 2012; Nyhan 2012; Lewandowsky,
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Ecker, et al. 2012; Nyhan and Reifler 2013 for summaries of research find-
ings). Less is known about how individuals react to conflicting infor-
mation about factual matters. In particular, few studies have examined
reactions to factual, but difficult-to-digest information that is followed up
by non-factual, but easier-to-digest information. Our study builds on a
few studies in the field of science communication, which examined per-
ceptions about vaccines and about anthropogenic climate change (ACC).
A major finding of the past few decades concerns the negative side effects
of journalistic ’false balance’: If the weight of evidence points to one con-
clusion then reporting on views that are not supported by overwhelming
evidence (or, as Dearing (1995) put it, giving a platform to ’maverick sci-
entists’) can lend credibility to the minority view and reduce confidence
in expert consensus (Dearing 1995; M. T. Boykoff and J. M. Boykoff 2004;
C. E. Clarke 2008; C. E. Clarke et al. 2015; Dixon and C. E. Clarke 2013;
Dixon, Mckeever, et al. 2015; Kortenkamp and Basten 2015; McCright,
Charters, et al. 2016; Koehler 2016; Linden et al. 2017).
McCright, Charters, et al. (2016) provided the first experiment directly
testing to what extent reporting on the views of ACC denial activists af-
fected belief in human-caused climate change and views on climate poli-
cies (McCright, Charters, et al. 2016, p.82). The authors showed respon-
dents a fabricated article about a report from the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, which, according to the article provided ’unequivo-
cal evidence that climate change is happening now, is caused by humans,
and is producing harmful societal impacts.’ Among other things, the
authors varied whether the article gave a voice to those denying ACC.
For some respondents (but not all) the article ended with an additional
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paragraph, saying that ’most conservative leaders and Republican politi-
cians believe that so-called climate change is vastly exaggerated’ and that
’some scientists ... are quick to point out that the Earth hasn’t actually
warmed in the last decade’. The authors found clear evidence of mo-
tivated reasoning. Right-leaning respondents reported weaker belief in
the reality of ACC. They were also more affected by exposure to climate
change denying views. (Among extremely conservative respondents see-
ing the extra paragraph about ACC denyers tipped average perceptions
of the veracity of a number of factual statements on ACC from just above
’I don’t know’, tending toward ’agree’ to just below ’I don’t know’, tend-
ing toward ’disagree’. Left-leaning respondents showed much higher
levels of belief in ACC, regardless of whether or not the article included
critical voices.
In a similar study, the effect of exposure to science-denying voices was
even stronger: Linden et al. (2017) investigated whether information about
scientific consensus on climate change survived counter-messages. They
did not. The authors showed respondents a pie chart stating that ’97%
of climate scientists have concluded that human-caused climate change
is happening’. Next, they showed some respondents (but not all) a (real)
petition urging the U.S. government to reject the Kyoto protocol because
’there is no convincing scientific evidence that human release of carbon
dioxide ... will ... cause catastrophic heating of the Earth’s atmosphere
...’. Here, the main dependent variable was not belief in human-cause cli-
mate change but perceptions of scientific consensus. Among those who
had only seen the initial pie chart, perceived consensus shifted from 71%,







TABLE 3.1: Experimental Design. (Treatment groups only.
Control group receives no second opinion.)
the countermessage: On average, those who had seen the pie chart, fol-
lowed up by the petition stated that 73% scientists agreed that humans
caused climate change, both before and after they read the article.
Our research goes beyond these studies in a few important ways: First,
we conduct research in a country other than the United States: the United
Kingdom. Second, we assess reactions to a topic that both right and left-
leaning individuals tend to feel strongly about and hold misperceptions
about: immigration. Third, and most importantly, we assess reactions
to a post-truth, rather than a denial counter-frame. We are unaware of
any studies testing counter-messages that do not deny facts but provide
other, essentially fact-free reasons to disregard them. Our study seeks to
contribute to filling this gap.
3.4 Method
To test the effect of post-truth comments on citizen reactions to inconve-
nient expert information we looked for a topic British people were mis-
informed about and felt strongly about so that they would have a moti-
vation to want to disregard factual information. We chose immigration.
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The issue was salient and polarizing, as the United Kingdom was (and is)
still recovering from the Brexit referendum, in which immigration played
a major role (Goodwin and Milazzo 2017; H. D. Clarke, Goodwin, and
Whiteley 2018; Hobolt 2016). We knew that significant parts of the pop-
ulation believed in false claims exaggerating the negative side-effects of
immigration or denying the positive (B. Duffy 2019). We suspected that
voters on the other side of the immigration divide would be equally likely
to believe in false claims denying the negative side-effects (or exaggerat-
ing the positive). We pre-tested a number of false claims on both sides
of the debate and found fairly high levels of belief across the political
spectrum. For the main study we chose to focus on two false claims that
were congenial to those with anti-immigration attitudes (’There has been
a sharp rise in the number of people applying for asylum in the UK in the
past ten years.’; ’European immigrants receive more in benefits and ser-
vices than they pay in taxes.’) and two that were congenial to those with
pro-immigration attitudes (’There has been a sharp rise in the number of
people applying for asylum in the UK in the past ten years."; "European
immigrants receive more in benefits and services than they pay in taxes.")
In the following, we refer to these claims as ’pro’ and ’anti-immigration
claims’. We designed an experiment in which we tested belief in each
of these four claims; then provided a fact check countering one of them,
provided a post-truth counter-message for some, and re-tested belief in
the false claim.
The experiment consisted of seven stages. In stage 1, we asked a few
background questions, including questions about immigration: Should
Britain allow more immigrants, fewer immigrants, or should the number
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of immigrants stay the same? We also asked how important respondents
thought this issue was to the country and to them. In stage 2, we tested
belief in false claims about immigration. Respondents were presented
with a list of eight statements, which they were asked to rate on a scale
from 0 (Definitely false) to 6 (Definitely true). Four of these statements
were the above-mentioned misperceptions about immigration. The re-
maining four were unrelated distractor items, including ’Fracking causes
earthquakes’ and ’England’s plastic bag usage dropped 85% since the 5p
charge was introduced.’ In stage 3, respondents were directed to a fact
check challenging the false claim they had rated closest to ’6 - Definitely
true’. (If veracity scores on two or more items were tied respondents were
randomly assigned to see one of the respective fact checks.)
The four fact checks were fabricated but the content was correct. They
were designed to be as effective and as realistic as possible, following
best practices and expert advice on countering misinformation (Nyhan
and Reifler 2013). Copying the format of popular fact checking sites in
the UK such as the BBC’s Reality Check and Full Fact the fact checks be-
gan with a short summary of the finding (’This statement is false.’) and
then provided a more detailed description, quoting offical statistics, and
including a graph. The false claims were not repeated; instead, correct
claims were affirmed. Wherever the corrective information may have
left a causal gap in the narrative an alternative causal explanation was
provided (Schwarz et al. 2007; Lee, Kim, and Schwarz 2015b, see). For
instance, to counter the claim that the UK had experienced a high in-
flux of asylum seekers in the past ten years the fact check conceded that
that there had indeed been a sharp rise of asylum seekers crossing into
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Europe. However, most of them never reached the UK but stayed in Ger-
many, Sweden, or Hungary. All fact checks were attributed to the same
authoritative source: an Oxford Professor of Economics who holds a PhD
from Harvard University and who previously worked as a consultant for
the Office of National Statistics (ONS). The expert had a generic English
name (Professor Richard Clarke). The fact checks included a small pic-
ture of a middle-aged professor in front of a black board. After read-
ing the fact check respondents answered a short battery of demographic
questions designed as distractors.
In stage 4, we tested how resistent factual corrections were to fact-free
dispute. At this point, the sample was divided: The control group (25%
of the sample) skipped stage 4 and moved directly to stage 5. The treat-
ment group (75% of the sample) saw a comment about the fact check
they had just read. Across all variations of the comment the commenter
was introduced as ’David Williams’ with a small picture of a white, grey-
haired man sitting on an outside chair wearing a beret and holding a
cigar in his right hand. Across all variations, Mr. Williams’ comment
started with the words, ’I would take these statistics with a big pinch
of salt’. In a 2*3 design, we varied the authoritativeness of the source
and the content of the message. David William was either described as
a ’Professor at the London School of Economics’ (authoritative) or as a
’Blogger’ (not authoritative). He gave one of three reasons to take these
statistics with a pinch of salt: In the ’Biased Source’ condition he wrote,
’The fact that someone is a professor doesn’t mean that they don’t have
an agenda. And we all know that there is a lot of scope to choose and
present statistics so that they end up saying just what you want them to
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say.’ In the ’Personal Experience’ condition he held that, ’A graph might
say one thing but the experience of people’s everyday lives could be quite
different. And I think that a lot of people reading those statistics will say:
that doesn’t sound like the world I live in.’ In the ’Alternative Facts’ con-
dition Mr. Williams did not deny the statistics but, in classic post-truth
fashion recommended to ignore them nonetheless: ’There’s so much in-
formation and so many statistics out there that it can be hard to know
what to believe. In that case, I think it’s best to trust your instincts even
if looks as if the facts are different.’
In stage 5, respondents re-evaluated the corrected claim on a scale from
0 (Definitely false) to 6 (Definitely true). In stage 6, we looked for signs
of post-truth reasoning. First, we presented respondents with a second
seven-point scale. This time, we asked them to rate the false statements
on a scale from 0 (Purely a matter of Fact) to 6 (Purely a matter of Opin-
ion). Next, we asked if the statistics they had seen were consistent with
what they believed. If the answer was ’No’ we followed up, asking re-
spondents to choose which of the following three statements best de-
scribed where they stood: a) ’The statistics are probably right but I be-
lieve something different.’, b) ’I think that the statistics are wrong’, or
c) ’The statistics made me change my mind.’ Finally, we asked if re-
spondents agreed or disagreed that ’it is OK to disagree with the facts
if that’s what you believe’. In stage 7, we asked two questions about
the source of the fact check (the Oxford professor) and the source of the
post-truth comment (the LSE professor or the blogger): How accurate did
respendents think the information was and how much they would gener-
ally trust what each of those people said about the issue of immigration?
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The full questionnaire is provided on page ?? of the appendix.
3.5 Hypotheses
We test three main hypotheses. First, we expect our fact check to re-
duce misperceptions: Fact Check Hypothesis (H1). Exposure to the fact
check reduces belief in false claims. In most misperception-correction
studies the percentage of respondents who radically change their percep-
tions after seeing corrective information is low (e.g. Nyhan and Reifler
2015a; Nyhan and Reifler 2015b; Wood and Porter 2016; Barrera et al.
2018). Given that our topic is particularly controversial we do not ex-
pect our fact checks to shift respondents from rating the false facts as
’true’ to rating them as ’false’. We do, however, expect them to reduce
the certainty with which respondents believe in false claims. To capture
those smaller changes in perceptions we refrained from using the classic
dichotomous ’true’ or ’false’ scale, relying instead on a more fine-tuned
scale allowing respondents to place the false statements on a scale from
0 (Definitely false) to 6 (Definitely true). To measure the effect of the
fact check we compare the pre and post fact check veracity scores among
control group respondents (who saw a fact check only, i.e. no post-truth
follow-up). On average, we expect them to rate the false claim somewhat
closer to ’false’ after they see the fact check than before they saw it.
Our main hypothesis concerns the effect of exposure to post-truth com-
ments: Post-truth Comment Hypothesis (H2). Exposure to post-truth
comments mitigates the effect of the fact check. To measure if the post-
truth comment made a dent in the effect of the fact check we compare the
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effect of the fact check (that is, the difference in pre and post-fact check
veracity scores) among those who saw the post-truth comment and those
who skipped it. We expect it to be larger among the latter, i.e. we expect
the fact check to be more effective among those who skipped the post-
truth comment. Just how effective the post-truth comment is ought to
depend on who makes it. Reputable sources have long been found to be
more persuasive, and more effective correcting false perceptions (Guil-
lory and Geraci 2013; Berinsky 2015; Nyhan and Reifler 2015a; Swire et
al. 2017; Schaffner and Luks 2018). Hence, we expect a comment com-
ing from an authoritative person (in our case, a professor) to carry more
weight than a comment coming from a non-authoritative person (a blog-
ger): Authoritativeness Hypothesis (H2a). Authoritativeness moder-
ates the effect of the post-truth comment. We also vary the content of
the message. Two of the messages we test are arguments (albeit weak ar-
guments) to disregard the evidence: one points out that the expert might
be biased; another one is based on anecdotal evidence disconfirming the
expert’s statistics.The third message is essentially fact-free; it does not
doubt the statistics but suggests to trust one’s instinct regardless of the
statistics. If our hypothesis is correct, that is, if people would clutch at
any straw to maintain their beliefs then even this message ought to nudge
them to disregard the evidence.
Finally, we attempted to gauge the state of post-truth reasoning in the
UK: How common is it to ’disagree’ with facts, or to denigrate them as
matters of opinion? This question is purely exploratory. We rely on our
control group (individuals who were not exposed to a post-truth com-
ment) for population estimates of agreement with post-truth statements.
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We also assess the effect of exposure to post-truth comments on agree-
ment with post-truth statements. To that end, we compare average agree-
ment with the post-truth arguments among those who saw the post-truth
comment and those who did not. We expect to see higher levels of agree-
ment among the former than among the latter. Post-truth Mindset Hy-
pothesis (H3). Exposure to post-truth comments nudges respondents to
a) categorise factual questions as matters of opinion, b) disagree with
the facts, and c) agree that it is okay to disagree with the facts.
3.6 Results
We cooperated with Deltapoll who fielded the survey to a representative
sample British citizens across England, Scotland, and Wales in June 2019
(n=2,936). 2 54% of respondents were female, 51% university-educated,
age ranged from 18 to 99 (mean age: 45 years, SD=17). Among those
who reported to have voted in the 2016 Brexit referendum, 52% voted to
leave the European Union. In the 2017 general election, 26% had voted
Conservative, 30% Labour, 6% Liberal Democratic, 6% UKIP, and 3% had
voted for the Green Party. Half of the sample (47 per cent) thought Britain
should take in fewer immigrants (values between ’-3’ and ’-1’), a quarter
(25%) thought Britain should take in ’many fewer’ (’-3’). About a fifth
of the sample (21%) thought Britain should take in more immigrants (val-
ues between ’+1’ to ’+3’, see histogram in figure 1 in the appendix). We
2The original sample size was 2,938; two participants were excluded because they
selected ’don’t know’ or the top option on almost all questions, resulting in a sample of
2,936 respondents.
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consider respondents who thought Britain should take in fewer immi-
grants to have ’anti-immigration’ attitudes and respondents who thought
Britain should take in more immigrants or who wanted no change to have
’pro-immigration’ attitudes. In total, we categorized 1388 respondents
(47%) as ’anti-immigration’, and 1548 (52%) as ’pro-immigration’.
Both pro- and anti-immigration respondents showed clear signs of mo-
tivated reasoning. Generally, anti-immigration respondents thought the
two anti-immigration claims were true; pro-immigration respondents thought
the two pro-immigration claims were true. Respondents had been shown
the fact check corresponding to the claim they had rated closest to ’6 -
Definitely true’. Almost ninety per cent of respondents saw a fact check
about a false fact they thought was somewhere on the ’true’ side of the
’false to true’ scale, i.e. a claim they had rated as 4, 5, or 6 - Definitely
true. 40 per cent saw a fact check about a statement they were absolutely
convinced was true (’6 - Definitely true’); about a fourth (23%) saw a fact
check about a a statement they had rated as 5, just a point below defi-
nitely true, and another fourth (24%) saw a fact check about a statement
they had rated as ’4’, i.e. just a point above the midpoint of the scale.
12 per cent saw a fact check challenging a statement they were not sure
about (’3’ on the scale from 0 to 6). Less than one per cent received statis-
tics about a statement they had rated as closer to ’false’ than to true. Only
one respondent correctly rated all four false facts as ’0 - Definitely false’.
One aspect of our research proved problematic: We directed respondents
to see the fact-check that corresponded to the false fact they rated closest
to true. We assumed that this would be one of the false facts that confirmed
their immigration opinions. This was not always the case: 18 per cent of
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our anti-immigration respondents saw a fact-check that either said that
most crime in London was committed by ethnic minorities, not white
people, or that immigration had a negative effect on low-paid wages.
Even more concerningly, 45 per cent of our pro-immigration respondents
saw a fact-check that said the number of asylum seekers had not risen at
all in last ten years or that immigrants pay more in taxes than they receive
in benefits and services. Leaving these respondents in the sample would
have inflated the effect of the fact-check because these people were moti-
vated to believe the expert. Similarly, leaving them in the sample would
have deflated the effect of the post-truth comment because they had no
interest in retaining their old beliefs. Therefore, we restricted the main
analyses to the n=1982 respondents who saw statistics that challenged
their opinions. This final sample includes 1156 anti-immigration and 826
pro-immigration respondents.
Effect of the fact-check on perceptions about the fact-checked fact
All four fact checks significantly reduced belief in false claims. We looked
at respondents in the control group (who were not exposed to a post-truth
comment) to assess the effect of the fact check. The most successful fact
check was the one countering the (anti-immigration) claim that immi-
gration had risen sharply over the past ten years. It shifted respondents
from an average rating of 5.34 on a scale from 0 (Definitely false) to 6
(Definitely true) to an average of 3.16. The least sucessful fact check was
the one countering the (pro-immigration) claim that immigration had no
effect on low-paid wages. Yet even that fact check moved respondents
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from an initial rating of 4.91 to a post- fact check rating of 3.55 (see fig-
ure 5 in the appendix). The difference between pre- and post- fact check
ratings were significant in all four cases, and the data was pooled for
subsequent analyses.
On average, the fact checks made respondents shift 1.77 points closer to
’false’ (paired t-test: t(491)=18.705, p=0.00, 95% confidence interval: 1.59-
1.96). Before they saw the fact check respondents rated the false claims
just about a point under ’definitely true’ (MT1=5.11, SD=1.02). After they
saw the fact check they rated it just above the mid-point of the scale
(MT2=3.37, SD=1.74, see histogram in figure ??). In general, it is diffi-
cult to change peoples’ perceptions. Immigration is an issue that engages
strong attitudes. We take the effect of our expert fact check as a success.
Two important factors predicted responsiveness to challenging statistics:
gender and attitude strenght. The gender gap appeared post-fact check:
Women were much more more responsive to the expert telling them the
statement was wrong. We observed no difference in how men and women
rated the false claims the first time they saw them. At the beginning of
the survey, both placed the false claims they would later see corrected
at around 5, that is, a point below ’Definitely true’. After seeing the fact
check, the men in our sample moved 1.5 points closer to ’false’ (MT2, Male=3.59,
SD=1.93), remaining well within the ’true’ side of the spectrum. Mean-
while, the women in our sample moved a whole 2 points closer to false,
reaching the midpoint of the scale (MT2, Female =3.2, SD=2.17). This gap
was largely driven by a gender gap in reactions to the two anti-immigration
fact-checks: Women were more convinced by the expert saying that im-
migrants paid more in taxes than they received in benefits and services
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and by the expert saying that the number of asylum seekers had re-
mained constant of the past ten years (see 6). 3
Consistent with motivated reasoning research, attitude extremity also
predicted people’s responsiveness to challenging statistics. The stronger
the anti-immigration attitudes and the stronger the pro-immigration at-
titudes, the more they resisted the fact-check. Respondents who thought
Britain should take in many fewer immigrants only moved a point and a
half closer to the false end of the scale. In contrast, respondents who only
wanted to reduce immigration a little bit, answering ’-1’ on a scale from
-3 (many fewer) to +3 (many more) moved a full 2.5 points closer to false
(see figure 7). 4 We observed a similar, albeit less pronounced pattern
among pro-immigration respondents: Those who thought Britain should
take in many more immigrants were half a point less convinced than those
who thought Britain should keep current levels of immigration. 5
belief T1 sd belief T2 sd diff trust sd accurate sd n
no comment 5.12 1.02 3.37 1.02 1.75 3.26 1.50 2.80 0.68 490
comment 5.04 1.05 3.87 1.05 1.16 2.98 1.48 2.67 0.69 1492
TABLE 3.2: Effect of the post-truth comment
3 The gender gap persists when controlling for attitude extremity: Even among
the most staunchly anti-immigration respondents women shifted significantly fur-
ther toward true than men: Mdiff, men, ’-3 many fewer’=1.24, Mdiff, women, ’-3 many fewer’=2.09,
t(149)=-2.51, p=0.01, see table ??.
4 Those who wanted to reduce immigration the most moved from definitely true
(MT1, ’-3’=5.68) to probably true, on average (MT2, ’-3’=3.95, diff=1.73). Those who
wanted to reduce immigration a little bit were fairly certain the false claims were true
before they saw it (MT1, ’-1’=4.93) and shifted to the false side of the scale, rating it as
probably false after they saw the fact check (MT2, ’-1’=2.42.)
5 Those who thought Britain should take in many more immigrants rated the
false facts as almost definitely true at the beginning of the survey (MT1, pro, +3=5.45),
and moved almost two points closer to the midpoint (MT2, pro, +3=3.23). Those who
wanted no change in immigration numbers rated the false facts as most probably
false (MT1, pro, no change=4.67), and moved to ’don’t know’ after they saw the fact check
(MT2, pro, no change=2.95).
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FIGURE 3.1: Perceived veracity of false claims, after expo-
sure to a fact check
Eighty pecent of our sample saw not only an expert statement correcting
a false fact but also a post-truth comment casting doubt on the expert fact
check. To replicate common post-truth comments we varied the reason
why the commenter said they would ’take these statistics with a grain of
salt’: They argued that a) the expert was biased, b) the expert’s statistics
did not match their personal experience, or c) suggested that when it
doubt it was best to trust one’s instincts.
The post-truth comment did significant damage to the effectiveness of
the fact-check. It did not cancel out out the entire effect of the fact-check
– but about half a point (or 45%) of it (see figure 3.1 and table 3.2). The
fact check alone made respondents to shift 1.75 points closer to ’false’. If
it was followed up by a post-truth comment it made respondents shift
1.16 points closer to ’false’. This half point difference is crucial: it kept
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respondents from moving to ’don’t know’. Those who were exposed
to the post-truth comment moved from thinking the false claim was al-
most certainly true (MT1, no comment=5.04) to thinking it was probably true
(MT1, no comment=3.87). Their peers who had not seen the post-truth com-
ment shifted much closer to the midpoint of the scale, almost admitting
that they did not know whether the claim was true or false (MT2, no comment=3.37).
6 Hence, we accept hypothesis 2a: Exposure to a post-truth comment re-
duced the effect of the correction on belief in false facts.
Exposure to a post-truth comment also decreased trust in the source of
the fact check and the perceived accuracy of the expert’s information:
On a scale from 0 (would not trust at all) to 6 (would trust a great deal)
those who only saw the fact check rated the Oxford professor closer to
trustworthy than to not trustworthy, Mno comment=3.26. Those who also
saw a post-truth comment rated him right between the two ends of the
scale, signalling they were not sure if this expert was trustworthy or not,
Mcomment=2.98 (see table 3.2). 7 To measure the perceived accuracy of
the expert’s information we used a four-point scale, where 4=very accu-
rate, 3=fairly accurate, 2=not very accurate, and 1=not at all accurate. On
average, respondents who only saw the fact check rated the information
just below ’fairly accurate’, Mno comment=2.80; respondents who also saw
a post-truth comment rated it as Mcomment=2.67. 8.
What the post-truth commenter said, or who they were, did not seem
6 The difference in how far those who saw the post-truth comment and those who
did not see it shifted toward ’false’ was statistically significant (t(688)=5.64, p=0.00).
7 The difference in means was statistically significant t(818)=3.52, p=0.00.
8 t(834)=3.52, p=0.00.
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to matter. A post-truth comment coming from ’David Williams, Profes-
sor of Economics at the London School of Economics’ did not have a
greater effect than a comment coming from ’David Williams, Blogger’.
Both pushed people back to think that the statement they just seen fact-
checked was, after all, probably true (average scores in all three condi-
tions were at about 4, see figure ??. Hence, we reject hypothesis 2b: au-
thoritativeness did not moderate the effect of the post-truth comment in
our experiment.
The content of their message was equally irrelevant. None of the three ar-
guments – about bias, personal experience, or that it was okay to disagree
with the facts – was significantly more or less effective than the other two
(see figure ??. 9
Responsiveness to the post-truth comment depended on some of the same
factors that predicted responsiveness to the fact check. Women were far
more likely to adapt their perceptions after seeing the fact check, but they
were also more swayed by the post-truth comment encouraging them to
retain their old beliefs. Figure ?? shows pre- and post-fact check verac-
ity scores depending on exposure to a post-truth comment. Overall, the
post-truth comment levelled out all gender differences in post-fact check
perceptions: after seeing the post-truth comment both men and women
thought the false claim they had seen fact-checked was probably true
(MT2, men/comment=3.90, MT2, women/comment=3.85, see table ??). The gen-
der gap was largely driven by women with anti-immigration attitudes:
9 We checked if gender affected responsiveness to the different sources and mes-
sages. It did not. Both male and female respondents were just as willing to listen to a
professor as they were to listen to the blogger, and both men and women were equally
responsive to any of the three arguments.
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FIGURE 3.2: Average post-fact check veracity scores de-
pending on gender and immigration opinions
Among this group, the post-truth comment canceled out about half of
the effect of the fact-check (diffno comment=2.26 - diffcomment=1.17). Tables
?? and ?? show OLS regression models indicating the effect of exposure to
a post-truth comment as well as a number of demographic variables on
the difference in veracity scores before and after exposure to a fact check.
3.6.1 Evidence of post-truth reasoning
Our final goal was to capture the extent of post-truth thinking in the UK
and to see if exposure to a post-truth comment might increase agreement
with classic post-truth arguments.
We rely on our control group (i.e. those who skipped the post-truth com-
ment) to explore the extent to which British citizens agree with classic
post-truth arguments. After they saw the fact check we gave them two
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seven-point scales: one ranging from ’true’ to ’false’, and one ranging
from ’fact’ to ’opinion’. Overall, 40 per cent thought of the corrected
claim as belonging in the realm of a ’matter of fact’, 25 per cent were
undecided, placing it in between a fact and an opinion, and 35 per cent
deemed it a ’matter of opinion’. A full 12 per cent ticked the extreme end
of the scale, saying the corrected claim as ’6 - Purely a matter of opinion’.
Next, we asked respondents to think back about the statistics they had
seen: ’Would you say that the statistics here were consistent with what
you believed?’ For 9 out of 10 the correct answer would have been ’no’:
89 per cent had rated the false claim on the ’true’ side of the scale. Ex-
actly half of those for whom the correct anwer would have been ’no’ said
’no’. We followed up and gave the no sayers three statements, asking
which described best where they stood. 20 per cent chose ’The statistics
are probably right, but I believe something different. 51 per cent chose
’I think that the statistics are wrong’. 29 per cent chose the post-truth
themed statement ’The statistics are probably right, but I believe some-
thing different’.
Finally, we asked, outright, if they agreed or disagreed that "It’s OK to
disagree with the facts if that’s what you believe". Two thirds of our
sample (68 per cent) agreed or strongly agreed. (51 per cent agreed; 17
per cent whostrongly agreed.)
The distribution was very similar across respondents evaluating the four
statements that challenged false claims on both sides of the spectrum of
immigration attitudes: The percentage of respondents who thought the
statement was a ’matter of opinion’ only varied between 32 (whiteCrime)
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and 35 per cent (costImmig). It varied slightly more depending on opin-
ions about immigration: Among those who wanted to raise immigration,
35 per cent said the statement they saw was a matter of opinion; among
those who wanted to curb immigration, 40 per cent said the statement
they saw was a matter of opinion.
These numbers refer to respondents who saw a fact check that challenged
their beliefs (n=490). Two things are noteworthy: First, the population es-
timates, that is, the statistics for the whole control group sample includ-
ing those who saw statistics that did not challenge their beliefs (n=737)
are only marginally different. 10 Second, the distribution among those
who saw a post-truth comment was almost identical, too. Exposure to
post-truth comments did not make people any more likely to rate the
corrected false claim as as a matter of opinion rather than a matter of fact
or to agree that it is ’okay to disagree with the facts if that’s what you be-
lieve: There was no significant difference in fact/opinion ratings and in
agreement that it is okay to disagree with facts. These null findings may
be due to ceiling effects: Given the extraordinarily high levels of agree-
ment with these post-truth statements in the control group there simply
wasn’t any scope for the post-truth comment to increase agreement any
further.
10Among the entire sample, 35 per cent thought the corrected statement was a matter
of opinion (same as the motivated to reject). 47 per cent of those who had rated the
false statement as ’true’ noticed that the statistics were inconsistent with what they had
thought, and of those, 32 per cent thought the post-truth statement best described where
they stood (’The statistics are right but I believe something different.’) 64 per cent agree
that it’s okay to disagree with the facts.
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Limitations
A few limitations ought to be noted. One concerns our sample: We had
to exclude a significant part of our sample (n=489/2936, i.e. 16 per cent)
from the analyses: respondents who believed in false facts on the ’wrong’
side of the immigration debate and, therefore, had no motivation to dis-
believe the expert that proved them wrong. The main culprit was our
asylum claim: Respondents on both sides of the spectrum evaluated the
claim that the number of asylum seekers had risen sharply in the past ten
years as true. Obviously, this affected the representative nature of our
sample. (Given the large size of our sample this is not dramatic: Our pur-
pose was not primarily to estimate the precise extent of fact-avoidance in
the electorate, but to explore how individuals react to facts when they
have the motivation to believe the post-truth comment rather than the
fact.) Nonetheless, future researchers ought to be careful to use false facts
that discriminate between opposing camps in a political debate.
Furthermore, the post-truth mindset we encountered in this experiment
ought to be interpreted with caution. Our aim was to explore if exposure
to post-truth surroundings created something of a post-truth citizen. The
people who answered our post-truth questions had just come across in-
formation that disconfirmed their factual beliefs and their opinions. Due
to financial contraints we were unable to include a control group that
would only have answered the post-truth questions.
Another limitation lies in the difficulty of studying the effect of post-truth
surroundings in a 2019 environment where all respondents will have
been exposed to some sort of a post-truth surroundings. We are well
110 Chapter 3.
aware that it is impossible to isolate the effect of post-truth surround-
ings. Our control group is not a pure control group; and our post-truth
comments did not create post-truth surroundings. They made them more
salient. Our study provides a first snapshot of post-truth thinking among
motivated reasoners in Brexit-era post-truth Britain. To fully understand
the extent of post-truth thinking and reactions to post-truth comments we
need panel data covering times of high and low post-truth popularity.
What is more, our study was confined to the effect of post-truth com-
ments on belief in debunked false facts. We did not measure how post-
truth surroundings affect political beliefs that are based on false facts. It
is well known that accepting factual corrections does not usually make
people change their political beliefs Gaines et al. 2007. Future studies
ought to examine the effect of post-truth surroundings on self-exposure
to expert information, on the way people process expert information, on
perceptions about beliefs on the other side of the political divide, on
willingness to engage with people on the other side of the debate and,
ultimately, on political opinions. Creative experimental designs exper-
iments are needed to understand how exposure exposure to post-truth
surroundings affects political behaviour in as close to real-world settings
as possible. Finally, future research ought to investigate ways in which
the effect of post-truth surroundings on reactions to expert information
can be restrained.
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3.7 Discussion and Conclusion
This project set out to explore the effect of post-truth surroundings on
reactions to unsolicited expert information that contradicts prior beliefs.
We chose immigration as a salient, and important issue on which vot-
ers across party lines hold misperceptions. In a nationally representative
survey we tested belief in false facts and exposed respondents to an au-
thoritative expert statement correcting the one false fact people rated as
closest to ’definitely true’. To mimick real-world settings in which news
rarely go un-commented and, in particular, to mimick the post-truth era
we then followed up with a post-truth comment, which we attributed to
either a highly authoritative source (a Professor of Economics at the LSE)
or a not authoritative source (a Blogger). We varied the reason the gave
to ’take these statistics with a pinch of salt’: The blogger/professor either
suggested that ’just because someone is a professor doesn’t mean they
don’t have an agenda’, or that ’that doesn’t sound like the world I live
in’ or, simply that ’there is so much information out there that it can be
hard to know what to believe. In that case, I think it’s best to trust your
instincts even if it looks as if the facts are different.’
Our findings have three important implications: First, not all hope is lost:
contrary to many correction-misperception studies, we find that citizens
do listen to expert information. They may not shift from rating a false fact
as ‘Definitely true’ to rating it as ‘Definitely false’. However, our nuanced
scale shows that fact-checks do move people away from the ’Definitely
true’ end of the scale and closer to ‘don’t know’: On average, respondents
shifted from 5 – just a point below ’Definitely true’ – to 3, the midpoint
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of the scale. We are not at all alarmed that they did not shift any fur-
ther toward the ’Definitely false’ side of the scale. Given the relevance of
priors in information processing we are perfectly content to see citizens
move from thinking they know a false fact is true to knowing they do not
know if it is true or false. (We would of course hope to see citizens reach
out for more information and, eventually, after having seen more reliable
information move toward rating a false facts as ’false’.
Second, people are not immune to post-truth surroundings. Our respon-
dents did not only listen to experts providing expert information; they
also listened to non-experts providing non-expert information. Wher-
ever the expert information was followed up by a post-truth comment
respondents were less willing to adapt their factual beliefs. On average,
the post-truth comment cancelled out about half a point of the effect of
the expert statement (.33 points among respondents on the favourable
side of the immigration debate and about .73 points among respondents
on the sceptical side of the debate). This effect is not dramatic: Contrary
to prior research (Linden et al. 2017) our second opinion did not cancel
out the entire effect of the correction. It was, nonetheless, consequential:
The post-truth comment caused respondents to remain on the ’true’ side
of the scale where the expert information on its own would have led them
to shift to evaluating a false claim as right between ’true’ and ’false’. No-
tably, people seem to respond to any comment telling them to disregard
the expert – regardless of how authoritative the source is or what they
say. When we attributed the comment that "I would take these statistics
with a pinch of salt" to a professor it did just as much damage as when we
3.7. Discussion and Conclusion 113
attributed it to a blogger. And when they continued saying that the ex-
pert was biased they had the same effect as when they continued saying
that the statistics did not match their personal experience or that ’I think
it’s best to trust your instincts even if it looks as if the facts are different’.
Third, we find a level of agreement with post-truth arguments that sup-
ports the notion a post-truth public. We asked our respondents to rate
the false fact they had just read about on a scale from ’0 - purely a matter
of fact’ to ’6 - purely a matter of opinion’. 35 per cent deemed it closer to
a matter of opinion than a matter of fact (i.e. rating it as 4, 5, or 6), with 13
per cent evaluating it as ’6 - purely a matter of opinion’. Next, we asked
if the statistics were in line with what they believed. If they were not we
followed up, asking respondents to choose one of three statements to de-
scribe where they stood. 32%) said "The statistics are probably right but
I believe something different." Finally, we presented respondents with
the statement that "It’s OK to disagree with the facts if that’s what you
believe." 46 per cent agreed. 18 per cent strongly agreed.
Democracies depend on voters’ ability to aquire accurate information.
If politicians use false facts and continue to use them after they have
been debunked then this information environment places a great deal
of weight on voter’s shoulders. If online newspapers, blogs, and social
media are slowly replacing state-regulated media and if, as we found,
virtually any post-truth comment erodes trust in experts, then it is not
surprising that it has become increasingly difficult for expert informa-
tion to reach the masses. And if, as we found, the line between fact and
opinon has become blurry, if voters believe it is okay to disagree with
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facts, if that’s what you believe, then this does not bode well for the fu-
ture of democratic decision making.
Our findings allow for one conclusion: Fact-checking is as important as
ever. We find that even under the most post-truth circumstances, experts
are still heard. We have exposed citizens to an expert statement that dis-
confirmed their factual beliefs, challenged their political beliefs, and fol-
lowed up with a post-truth comment saying it was okay to ignore the
expert. And yet, the expert statement made them shift slightly closer to
’don’t know’. We conclude that the battle is not lost – but it requires some
serious fighting. Fact-checking charities and public broadcasters such as
the BBC Reality Check are fighting Goliath – they deserve our gratitude
and they deserve our public funding.
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Conclusion
Humans are not known to be unbiased information processors. Decades
of research in psychology and political science confirm the confirmation
bias we see in others and others see in us. This dissertation set out to ex-
plore how the sitation we are in when exposed to challenging information
affects the way we react to it. I examined the effect of three potentially
detrimental situations, stress, status threat, and post-truth surroundings,
on two motivated-reasoning-related outcomes: the likelihood of detect-
ing (and punishing) false facts from friendly sources and the likelihood
of accepting expert information that challenges one’s political views.
In chapter 1, I attemted to examine the effect of stress on belief in false
claims propagated by the Leave campaign in the United Kingdom’s June
2016 EU referendum. The stress treatment, exposure to a 35 second time
limit on three questions about the EU, had no effect on belief in false
facts among the 99 twitter-recruited leave voters. I argued that the null
findings were due to an unstressful stress treatment. Hence, the effect of
stress on confirmation bias in poltical campaigns remains to be studied
in future research. Nonetheless, exploratory analyses revealed heteroge-
neous treatment: Among low status individuals the relatively unstress-
full stressr did have an effect: Examining a subset of individuals who had
placed themselves on the lower echelons of a social status latter those
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who had been timed were slightly (but not significantly) more likely to
believe in false claims. This pointed to an avenue for future research:
Could the perception that one’s group is structurally disadvantaged im-
pair people’s ability (or willingness) to detect false facts?
In chapter 2, I explored the effect of status differences on information pro-
cessing. The proposed mechanism combined insights from motivated
reasoning and social identity theory: if you feel that your group is dis-
advantaged relative to relevant other groups and if a politician recog-
nizes this disadvantage and promises to raise your group’s status (ide-
ally above and beyond the status of other groups) then you will want to
believe them. If that leader then says or does something that ought to set
off alarm bells – for instance, if they say something that is, simply, false
– then you will put on blinders and ignore it. The same should hold for
individuals who are (or believe to be) part of a high-status groups whose
higher status is threatened: If you feel that your group is about to lose its
superior (e.g. cultural or socio-economical) standing or if feel that your
group has already lost their legitimately higher status and if you are then
exposed to a politician who promises to prevent or undo this status loss
then you will want to believe them. If these leaders say anything that
could compromise their credibility then you have every reason to ignore
those cues. To test this hypothesis, I designed a laboratory experiment.
To manipulate status differences I set up a rigged pub quiz. To test tol-
erance of false claims I exposed respondents to false claims coming from
either a person who congratulated the winning team, or a person who
complained that this quiz was unfair and that the disadvantaged team
should receive an extra payment to compensate for their disadvantage.
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The design proved (very) successful at creating low status: The disad-
vantaged team performed much worse than the advantaged team and
received a much lower payoff, on average. It was also successful a creat-
ing high status: The advantaged team performed much better and made
much more. It did not however succeed at creating a feeling of status
threat among the advantaged group. (Hence, the effect of status threat
on information processing remains to be studied.) The low-status team
behaved as expected: They overlooked false facts in the feedback that
favoured their own team but noticed (and punished) the same false facts
when they appeared in the feedback that favoured the other team. These
results do not bode well for the future of factual accuracy in political de-
bates in an increasingly populist world.
In chapter 3, I investigated the effect of post-truth surroundings. This
time, the outcome variable was not tolerance of false facts but tolerance
of correct facts – more specifically, the willingness to give up factual be-
liefs after seeing official statistics that prove them wrong. In a large-scale
survey experiment respondents were presented with expert opinions re-
futing a false belief they held about immigration. Next, some (but not all)
respondents were exposed to a post-truth comment nudging them to dis-
regard the expert advice and return to their original beliefs. As expected,
the post-truth cancelled out some – but not all – of the effect of the expert
statement.
Overall, this dissertation adds to a growing body of research that testifies
to the difficulty of accepting challenging political information. Much of
this research focuses on individual characteristics of those who are most
likely to overlook false information, and on ways to design a bullet-proof
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fact check (Nyhan 2012; Nyhan and Reifler 2013; Lewandowsky, Ecker, et
al. 2012; Nyhan and Reifler 2012; Graves, Nyhan, and Reifler 2016). The
findings are invaluable, and have informed fact checking websites. (Al-
though some findings, such as the recommendation not to repeat false
information, are taking longer to find their way into public broadcast-
ing.) The study I reported on in chapter 3 testifies to the importance of
fact checks: People do have accuracy goals and reading these fact checks
does reduce misperceptions, even among those who are least inclined to
believe them. However, the problem in the Trump election, or the Brexit
referendum was not that voters read a fact-check and did not believe it.
The problem was that most voters never read those fact checks, however
well designed.
This dissertation contributes to research on politically motivated reason-
ing by pointing to a so-far understudied field of potential predictors: the
situation a person is in when they are exposed to challenging informa-
tion. The three studies presented here above provide but a glimpse into
the role of stress, group dynamics, and other people’s opinions. Nonethe-
less, this first glimpse is enough to suggest that scholarly attention ought
to shift toward exploring situational factors. Enough research has at-
tempted to find who turns a blind eye to false facts – even if some may be
more or less open to challenging information it is now clear that we all
are vulnerable to these biases. Acknowledging this fact makes it all the
more important to turn to the situations that worsen these biases. Ulti-
mately, the goal of research on politically motivated reasoning is not to
blame individuals for being guilty of motivated reasoning biases. It is
to find ways to reach those who happen to be in a situation that makes
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them susceptibile to overlooking dodgy information, or to accepting false
information. The goal is to devise policy recommendations that make it
possible to communicate potentially threatening information in a non-
threatening way. To get there, we need to identify the situations in which
individuals are particularly vulnerable to misinformation, and we need
to understand how they react to it in those situations (for instance trac-
ing information search and evaluating real data), and we need to create
situations that alleviate these biases.
A particularly promising avenue for future research is to explore the role
of group dynamics and inequality on politically motivated reasoning. If,
as the findings of chapter 2 suggest structural group disadvantage makes
individuals more susceptible to overlooking false facts then this points
to an urgent need for research. A number of questions ought to be an-
swered: First, is the mere perception that one’s group is disadvantaged
sufficient to trigger (or worsen) politically motivated reasoning? Second,
is status threat, that is, the fear that one’s group may soon be sliding
down the social ladder sufficient to trigger (or worsen) politically moti-
vated reasoning? Third, and most importantly, is there anything policy
makers can do to facilitate reception of challenging political information
in difficult group settings? For instance, might only just acknowledg-
ing a disadvantaged group’s disadvantage help group members accept
difficult-to-digest information? Given what we already know about how
group dynamics affect cognition and given the current trend for state or
other actors to channel group-targed misinformation to specific groups
and to induce among those groups a feeling of structural disadvantage,
unfair treatment, or lack of due respect it is of vital importance for future
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research to find ways to counter these trends. We need to find ways to
reach those who are in a situation that leaves them vulnerable to actors
exploiting their status for political gain.
A promising way forward is for political scientists to team up with re-
searchers and practicioners to devise and test strategies. Research find-
ings ought to inform public broadcasting on how to report information
that may be threatening to some groups. We ought to team up with jour-
nalists to test ways to communicate challenging information effectively
(and, on a side note, to test the effectiveness of existing strategies and the
many new ways in which journalists are already attempted to counter
false information). In addition, we ought to team up with organizations
at the forefront of misinformation campaigns, evaluate ways in which
they try to counter misinformation, and test (and evaluate) new ways to
do so. Political scientists should also cooperate with educators. Long-
term, research findings need to find their way into public education and
into textbooks. Here, the goal is that facts, such as historical events that
may be threatening to some are not only taught to all but accepted by all
and, even more importantly, that children and young people are taught
to be literate information processors, that is, that they learn the tools they
need to evaluate political information and to be en guard against false
information.
Nonetheless, if the recent outcy over post-truth politics has shown one
thing, it is that voters – not all, but many – notice deviations from the
norm of truthfulness in political speech. Enough of the public has taken
offence for this phenomenon to be named: post-truth. If voters take of-
fense at political campaigns printing false figures on their buses, if they
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protest when state-regulated media channels spread false stories, or when
politicians tweet falsehoods into the world then this shows that our era
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(A) Twitter account used to launch the survey
(B) Timing of participation
FIGURE A.1: Survey Experiment
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(A) Treatment group
(B) Control group
FIGURE A.2: Stress treatment
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FIGURE A.3: False (and correct) claims
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(A) How interested were you in the EU referendum that was held in the UK on
June 23rd?
(B) How sure were you about your vote choice?
FIGURE A.4: Interest and Vote Choice
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(A) How many good reasons were there to leave?
(B) How many good reasons were there to remain?
FIGURE A.5: Reasons to remain and reasons to leave
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(A) with timer
(B) no timer
FIGURE A.6: Time spent answering quiz questions
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(A) with timer
(B) no timer
FIGURE A.7: Time spent answering quiz questions (low
status respondents)
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(A) with timer
(B) no timer
FIGURE A.8: Time spent evaluating false campaign claims
(and distractors)
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(A) If Britain had remained in the EU it would have had to accept Turkish mem-
bership.
(B) The EU could have forced British soldiers to join a European army.
FIGURE A.9: Belief in false campaign claims
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(A) Leaving the EU frees up GBP 350m a week for the NHS.
(B) The EU could have made Britain join the Euro.
FIGURE A.10: Belief in false campaign claims (continued)
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(A) The Queen backs Brexit.
(B) Misperceptions index
FIGURE A.11: Belief in false campaign claims (continued)
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(A) All council areas in Scotland voted to remain in the EU.
(B) The pound plunged to its lowest level since 1985 after Britain voted to leave
the EU.
FIGURE A.12: Belief in correct statements (continued)
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FIGURE A.13: Time spent evaluating false campaign claims




B.1 Screenshots of the laboratory experiment
FIGURE B.1: Example quiz questions (as shown to a Team
B player)
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FIGURE B.2: Perceived bias (shown before the last ques-
tion)
FIGURE B.3: Payoffs
B.1. Screenshots of the laboratory experiment 139
(A) Number of difficult questions by team
(B) Payoffs by team
FIGURE B.4: Number of difficult questions and payoffs for
both teams
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FIGURE B.5: Respondents’ feedback
FIGURE B.6: Perceived legitimacy of difference in payoffs
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FIGURE B.7: Perceived Bias
FIGURE B.8: Emotional Reactions to Different Payoffs
FIGURE B.9: Perceived likelihood that Team B’s payoffs
will be topped up (stability of group differences)
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(A) Not including any false claims
(B) Including false claims
FIGURE B.10: ’Fair Play’ Feedback
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(A) Not including any false claims
(B) Including false claims
(C) Attention Check
FIGURE B.11: ’Unfair’ Feedback
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FIGURE B.12: DVs – ’Fair Play’ Feedback
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Chapter 3 – Graphs
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FIGURE 1: Immigration opinions
FIGURE 4: Fact checked statements by immigration opin-
ions
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(A) ’There has been a sharp rise in the number of people applying for asylum in
the UK in the past ten years.’
(B) ’Immigrants receive ore in benefits and services than they pay in taxes.’
FIGURE 2: False claims that affirm anti-immigration opin-
ions
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(A) ’The majority of crimes in London are committed by white people, not ethnic
minorities.’
(B) ’Immigration to the UK does not affect the wages of the low-paid.’
FIGURE 3: False claims that affirm pro-immigration opin-
ions
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FIGURE 5: Effect of the fact-check on belief in the four false
claims (Control group only)
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